# [MS-TNAP]:

# Telnet: NT LAN Manager (NTLM) Authentication Protocol

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### 1 Introduction

Telnet is an application layer protocol, as specified in [RFC854], and is supplemented by various other RFCs (Requests for Comments). The Telnet Authentication Option (as specified in [RFC2941]), specifies the authentication option to the Telnet protocol as a generic method for negotiating an authentication type and mode, including whether encryption should be used and whether credentials should be forwarded. While the Telnet Authentication Option specifies command and message formats, it does not specify an authentication type. This document specifies how Telnet client software can use the Telnet: NT LAN Manager (NTLM) Authentication Protocol to authenticate itself to a Telnet server.

Sections 1.8, 2, and 3 of this specification are normative and can contain the terms MAY, SHOULD, MUST, MUST NOT, and SHOULD NOT as defined in <a href="[RFC2119]">[RFC2119]</a>. Sections 1.5 and 1.9 are also normative but do not contain those terms. All other sections and examples in this specification are informative.

## 1.1 Glossary

The following terms are specific to this document:

- **connection-oriented NTLM**: A particular variant of **NTLM** designed to be used with connection-oriented remote procedure call (RPC), as described in [MS-NLMP].
- **IS command**: A Telnet Authentication Option command used to send authentication information (as specified in [RFC2941]). The structure of **IS command**, as specified in [RFC2941] section 2, is: IAC SB AUTHENTICATION IS authentication-type-pair <auth data> IAC SE.
- **little-endian**: Multiple-byte values that are byte-ordered with the least significant byte stored in the memory location with the lowest address.
- **NT LAN Manager (NTLM) Authentication Protocol**: A protocol using a challenge-response mechanism for authentication (2) in which clients are able to verify their identities without sending a password to the server. It consists of three messages, commonly referred to as Type 1 (negotiation), Type 2 (challenge) and Type 3 (authentication). For more information, see [MS-NLMP].
- NTLM AUTHENTICATE\_MESSAGE: The NTLM AUTHENTICATE\_MESSAGE packet defines an NTLM authenticate message that is sent from the client to the server after the NTLM CHALLENGE\_MESSAGE is processed by the client. Message structure and other details of this packet are specified in [MS-NLMP].
- NTLM CHALLENGE\_MESSAGE: The NTLM CHALLENGE\_MESSAGE packet defines an NTLM challenge message that is sent from the server to the client. NTLM CHALLENGE\_MESSAGE is generated by the local NTLM software and passed to the application that supports embedded NTLM authentication. This message is used by the server to challenge the client to prove its identity. Message structure and other details of this packet are specified in [MS-NLMP].
- **NTLM message**: A message that carries authentication (2) information. Its payload data is passed to the application that supports embedded NTLM authentication by the NTLM software installed on the local computer. NTLM messages are transmitted between the client and server embedded within the application protocol that is using NTLM authentication. There are three types of NTLM messages: NTLM NEGOTIATE\_MESSAGE, NTLM CHALLENGE\_MESSAGE, and NTLM AUTHENTICATE MESSAGE.
- **NTLM NEGOTIATE\_MESSAGE**: The NEGOTIATE\_MESSAGE packet defines an NTLM negotiate message that is sent from the client to the server. The **NTLM NEGOTIATE\_MESSAGE** is generated by the local **NTLM software** and passed to the application that supports embedded **NTLM** authentication. This message allows the client to specify its supported **NTLM** options to the server. Message structure and other details are specified in [MS-NLMP].

- NTLM software: Software that implements the NT LAN Manager (NTLM) Authentication Protocol.
- **REPLY command**: A Telnet Authentication Option (as specified in [RFC2941]) message used to send replies to the **IS command**. The structure of this command, as specified in [RFC2941] section 2, is: IAC SB AUTHENTICATION REPLY authentication-type-pair <auth data> IAC SE.
- **SEND command**: A Telnet Authentication Option (as specified in [RFC2941]) command used to request authentication information. The structure of this command, as specified in [RFC2941] section 2, is: IAC SB AUTHENTICATION SEND authentication-type-pair-list IAC SE.
- **MAY, SHOULD, MUST, SHOULD NOT, MUST NOT:** These terms (in all caps) are used as defined in [RFC2119]. All statements of optional behavior use either MAY, SHOULD, or SHOULD NOT.

#### 1.2 References

Links to a document in the Microsoft Open Specifications library point to the correct section in the most recently published version of the referenced document. However, because individual documents in the library are not updated at the same time, the section numbers in the documents may not match. You can confirm the correct section numbering by checking the <a href="Errata">Errata</a>.

#### 1.2.1 Normative References

We conduct frequent surveys of the normative references to assure their continued availability. If you have any issue with finding a normative reference, please contact <a href="mailto:dochelp@microsoft.com">dochelp@microsoft.com</a>. We will assist you in finding the relevant information.

[MS-DTYP] Microsoft Corporation, "Windows Data Types".

[MS-NLMP] Microsoft Corporation, "NT LAN Manager (NTLM) Authentication Protocol".

[RFC1091] Network Working Group, VanBokkelen, J., "Telnet Terminal-Type Option", RFC 1091, February 1989, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1091.txt

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997, <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt">http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt</a>

[RFC2941] Ts'o, T., and Altman, J., "Telnet Authentication Option", RFC 2941, September 2000, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2941.txt

[RFC854] Postel, J., and Reynolds, J., "Telnet Protocol Specification", STD 8, RFC 854, May 1983, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc854.txt

[RFC855] Postel, J., and Reynolds, J., "Telnet Option Specifications", STD 8, RFC 855, May 1983, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc855.txt

#### 1.2.2 Informative References

[MS-TVTT] Microsoft Corporation, "Telnet: VTNT Terminal Type Format Data Structure".

[SSPI] Microsoft Corporation, "SSPI", http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa380493.aspx

### 1.3 Overview

The Telnet: NT LAN Manager (NTLM) Authentication Protocol specifies how a Telnet client and Telnet server can use the NT LAN Manager (NTLM) Authentication Protocol (as specified in <a href="MS-NLMP">[MS-NLMP]</a>) so that the Telnet server can authenticate the Telnet client. **NTLM** is a challenge-response style

authentication protocol that depends on the application layer protocols to transport NTLM packets from client to server and from server to client.

The Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol is an extension to the Telnet Authentication Option, as specified in <a href="[RFC2941]">[RFC2941]</a>. While the Telnet Authentication Option specifies how a Telnet server and Telnet client can negotiate an authentication scheme, the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol Specification specifies how a Telnet client and Telnet server should encapsulate NTLM messages in the Telnet Authentication Option SEND, IS, and REPLY commands so that the Telnet server can authenticate the Telnet client by using the NTLM Authentication Protocol. The Telnet client and the Telnet server must use the protocol specified in Telnet Authentication Option, as specified in <a href="[RFC2941]">[RFC2941]</a>, to negotiate for NTLM authentication before they can use the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol.

The Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol is an embedded protocol in which Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol packets are embedded in Telnet Authentication Option (as specified in [RFC2941]) commands. The following diagram illustrates the relationship between the NTLM message, the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol packet, and the Telnet Authentication Option command.




Figure 1: Relationship between NTLM message, Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol packet, and Telnet Authentication Option command

The Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol is a pass-through protocol that does not specify the structure of NTLM information. Instead, the protocol relies on the software that implements the NTLM Authentication Protocol (as specified in [MS-NLMP]) to process each NTLM message to be sent or received.

The Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol defines a server and a client role.

The sequence that follows shows the typical flow of packets between client and server.

- 1. The Telnet client sends an **NTLM NEGOTIATE\_MESSAGE** embedded in a Telnet packet to the server.
- 2. On receiving the Telnet packet with an NTLM NEGOTIATE\_MESSAGE, the Telnet server sends an **NTLM CHALLENGE\_MESSAGE** embedded in a Telnet packet to the client.
- 3. In response, the Telnet client sends an **NTLM AUTHENTICATE\_MESSAGE** embedded in a Telnet packet to the server to successfully complete the authentication process.

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The NTLM NEGOTIATE\_MESSAGE, NTLM CHALLENGE\_MESSAGE, and NTLM AUTHENTICATE\_MESSAGE packets contain NTLM authentication data that must be processed by the **NTLM software** installed on the local computer. How to retrieve and process NTLM messages is specified in [MS-NLMP].

Implementers of the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol must possess a working knowledge of the Telnet Protocol (as specified in [RFC854]), the Telnet Option (as specified in [RFC855]), the Telnet Authentication Option (as specified in [RFC2941]), and the NTLM Authentication Protocol (as specified in [MS-NLMP]).

### 1.4 Relationship to Other Protocols

The Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol is an extension to the Telnet Authentication Option (as specified in <a href="[RFC2941]">[RFC2941]</a>) and is an embedded protocol. Unlike standalone application protocols, such as Telnet or Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol packets are embedded in the Telnet Authentication Option commands.

The Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol specifies only the sequence in which a Telnet server and Telnet client must exchange NTLM messages to successfully authenticate the client to the server. It does not specify how the client obtains NTLM messages from the local NTLM software, or how the Telnet server should process NTLM messages. The Telnet client and Telnet server implementations depend on the availability of an implementation of the NTLM Authentication Protocol (as specified in [MS-NLMP]) to obtain and process NTLM messages.

The Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol and Telnet VTNT Terminal Type Format [MS-TVTT] are both extensions to the Telnet Protocol ([RFC854]). Telnet:NTLM Authentication Protocol is an extension to the Telnet Authentication Option (as specified in [RFC2941]) and Telnet VTNT Terminal Type Format is an extension to the Telnet Terminal Type option (as specified in [RFC1091]). If the chosen authentication option is NTLM, then, only after Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol authenticates the client, can any communication using Telnet VTNT Terminal Type Format happen between the Telnet server and client.

#### 1.5 Prerequisites/Preconditions

Because the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol depends on NTLM to authenticate the client to the server, both server and client must have access to an implementation of the NTLM Authentication Protocol (as specified in <a href="MS-NLMP">[MS-NLMP]</a>) capable of supporting **connection-oriented NTLM**.<a href="MS-NLMP">(ST)</a>

## 1.6 Applicability Statement

The Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol must be used only when implementing a Telnet client that needs to authenticate to a Telnet server by using NTLM authentication.

#### 1.7 Versioning and Capability Negotiation

This document covers versioning issues in the following areas:

- Security and Authentication Methods: The Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol supports the NTLMv1 and NTLMv2 authentication methods, as specified in [MS-NLMP].
- Capability Negotiation: The Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol does not support negotiation of the NTLM Authentication Protocol version to use. Instead, the NTLM Authentication Protocol version must be configured on both the client and the server prior to authentication. NTLM Authentication Protocol version mismatches are handled by the NTLM Authentication Protocol implementation, and not by the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol.

## 1.8 Vendor-Extensible Fields

The Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol does not have any vendor-extensible fields.

# 1.9 Standards Assignments

The Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol does not use any standards assignments.

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# 2 Messages

The following sections specify how Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol messages are transported and give details of message syntax.

This protocol references commonly used data types as defined in [MS-DTYP].

## 2.1 Transport

The Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol does not establish transport connections. Instead, Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol messages are encapsulated in Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol commands. How Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol messages must be encapsulated in Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol commands is specified in section 2.2.

## 2.2 Message Syntax

The three commands in which Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol messages can be embedded are <u>SEND</u>, <u>IS</u>, and REPLY. The structure of each of these commands is as follows:

- 1. IAC SB AUTHENTICATION SEND authentication-type-pair-list IAC SE
- 2. IAC SB AUTHENTICATION IS authentication-type-pair <auth data> IAC SE
- 3. IAC SB AUTHENTICATION REPLY authentication-type-pair <auth data> IAC SE

The Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol specifies the values that the authentication-type-pair-list and the <auth data> fields must be filled with, when the negotiated authentication mechanism is NTLM. That is, the payload of the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol is solely the authentication-type-pair-list field in the case of the SEND command; and the payload consists of the authentication-type-pair and the <auth data> fields in the cases of the IS and REPLY commands.

The following figure illustrates the relationship between SEND commands and a Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol packet.




Figure 2: Relationship between SEND commands and Telnet: NTLM Authentication packet

The following figure illustrates the relationship between IS and REPLY commands and a Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol packet.

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



Figure 3: Relationship between IS and REPLY commands and Telnet: NTLM Authentication packet

The message syntax of a Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol message depends on the Telnet Authentication Option command (as specified in [RFC2941]) in which it is to be embedded, whether a SEND (section 2.2.1), IS (section 2.2.2), or REPLY (section 2.2.2) command.

### 2.2.1 Telnet Authentication Option Command SEND

When the Telnet Authentication Option command (as specified in [RFC2941]) is SEND, the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol specifies how an implementation must fill the **authentication-type-pair-list** field. This field is specified in [RFC2941] as being comprised of two subfields: **AuthenticationType** and **Modifier**. Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol does not specify any fields for the message other than those specified in [RFC2941].

The structure of these fields is specified in [RFC2941]. This section specifies how an implementation must use these fields in the context of the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol, and specifies the structure of these fields for completeness and clarity.



**AuthenticationType (1 byte):** A Telnet server MUST set the value of this field to 0x0F to request the use of NTLM as the preferred authentication mechanism. This **AuthenticationType** value indicates to the Telnet client that it must send the NTLM NEGOTIATE\_MESSAGE.

Messages in which **AuthenticationType** is set to a value other than 0x0F MUST NOT be processed by the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol.

Modifier (1 byte): This BYTE field specifies modifiers to the authentication method specified in the AuthenticationType field, as specified in [RFC2941]. The Telnet Authentication Option (as specified in [RFC2941]) defines Modifier as five 1-bit fields. The first two bits are processed as a pair, the AUTH\_WHO\_MASK bit and the AUTH\_HOW\_MASK bit. The third and fifth bits in the modifier are the ENCRYPT\_MASK bits. These bits are used to determine if and how encryption is enabled. The fourth bit field is the INI\_CRED\_FWD\_MASK bit. This bit is set either to INI\_CRED\_FWD\_ON or INI\_CRED\_FWD\_OFF.

In the context of the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol, the following modifiers MUST be used when an implementation sends a message.

Modifiers	Symbolic value	Bit value(s)
AUTH_WHO_MASK	AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER	0

Modifiers	Symbolic value	Bit value(s)
AUTH_HOW_MASK	AUTH_HOW_ONE_WAY	0
ENCRYPT_MASK (2 bits)	ENCRYPT_OFF	0
INI_CRED_FWD_MASK	INI_CRED_FWD_OFF	0

## 2.2.2 Telnet Authentication Option Command IS or REPLY

When the Telnet Authentication Option command (as specified in <a href="[RFC2941]">[RFC2941]</a>) is REPLY or IS, the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol messages are embedded in the **authentication-type-pair** and <auth-data> fields. The message structure specified in this section maps to the coalesced space of **authentication-type-pair** and <auth-data> fields in IS and REPLY commands.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	1 0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	2	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	3	1
	AuthenticationType Modifier NTLM_CommandCode NTLM_DataSize																														
	NTLM_BufferType																														
	NTLM_Data (variable)																														

**AuthenticationType (1 byte):** In the context of the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol, a Telnet client MUST set this field to 0x0F in all IS messages to indicate that the authentication mechanism used is NTLM and a Telnet server MUST set this field to 0x0F in all REPLY messages.

Modifier (1 byte): This BYTE field specifies modifiers to the authentication method specified in the AuthenticationType field, as specified in [RFC2941]. The Telnet Authentication Option (as specified in [RFC2941]) defines Modifier as five 1-bit fields. The first two bits are processed as a pair—the AUTH\_WHO\_MASK bit and the AUTH\_HOW\_MASK bit. The third and fifth bits in the modifier are the ENCRYPT\_MASK bits. These bits are used to determine if and how encryption is enabled. The fourth bit field is the INI\_CRED\_FWD\_MASK bit. This bit is set either to INI\_CRED\_FWD\_OPF.

In the context of the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol, the following modifiers MUST be used when a client or server implementation sends a message.

Modifiers	Symbolic value	Bit value(s)
AUTH_WHO_MASK	AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER	0
AUTH_HOW_MASK	AUTH_HOW_ONE_WAY	0
ENCRYPT_MASK (2 bits)	ENCRYPT_OFF	0
INI_CRED_FWD_MASK	INI_CRED_FWD_OFF	0

**NTLM\_CommandCode (1 byte):** This BYTE field specifies a sub stage of NTLM authentication. The possible values for this field are as follows:

Name	Value
NTLM_NEGOTIATE	0x00
NTLM_CHALLENGE	0x01
NTLM_AUTHENTICATE	0x02
NTLM_ACCEPT	0x03
NTLM_REJECT	0x04

NTLM\_DataSize (4 bytes): This 32-bit unsigned integer field specifies the number of bytes in the NTLM\_Data field. Data in this field MUST be in little-endian format.

**NTLM\_DataSize** MUST be present only if **NTLM\_CommandCode** is one of the following: NTLM\_NEGOTIATE, NTLM\_CHALLENGE, or NTLM\_AUTHENTICATE.

NTLM\_BufferType (4 bytes): This 32-bit unsigned integer field specifies the type of NTLM\_Data. Data in this field MUST be in little-endian format. This field indicates the type of the buffer in NTLM\_Data. Currently, the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol does not specify how this field is processed. For compatibility with older versions of client and server software, an implementation MUST set this field to 0x00000002. An implementation SHOULD recognize 0x00000002 as indicating that the supplied buffer is a SECBUFFER TOKEN buffer type.<2>

**NTLM\_BufferType** MUST be present only if **NTLM\_CommandCode** is one of the following: NTLM NEGOTIATE, NTLM CHALLENGE, or NTLM AUTHENTICATE.

**NTLM\_Data (variable):** This variable-length field contains the buffer that holds an NTLM message. The Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol does not specify how an implementation processes this field. Instead, an implementation passes this data to the local NTLM protocol implementation for processing.


**NTLM\_Data** MUST be present only if **NTLM\_CommandCode** is one of the following: NTLM NEGOTIATE, NTLM CHALLENGE, or NTLM AUTHENTICATE.

# 3 Protocol Details

The following sections provide a detailed specification of Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol message computation. Sections 3.1.5 and 3.2.5 specify how the client and server must compute messages and respond to messages, respectively.

## 3.1 Client Details

The following state diagram illustrates the activities of the client during Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol processing. The start state is the start of Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol message exchanges, and the end state marks the completion of Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol message exchanges.



## Figure 4: Client activity during Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol processing

- send\_not\_received (start state): This state indicates that the client has not received the <u>SEND</u> command from the server.
- 2. **negotiate\_data\_sent:** This state indicates that the client received a SEND command from the server, and in response, the client sent an IS command with the NTLM NEGOTIATE\_MESSAGE.
- 3. **authenticate\_data\_sent:** This state indicates that the client received an <u>IS</u> [NTLM Command Code = **NTLM\_CHALLENGE**] from the server, and in response, the client sent an IS command with NTLM AUTHENTICATE\_MESSAGE.
- 4. **authentication\_complete** (end state): This state indicates the completion of Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol message exchanges.

The actions that the client takes in response to an incoming message from the server are specified in section 3.1.5.

This state diagram is included for explanatory purposes only. Implementations are not required to use the same state names as used in the diagram. Section 3.1.5 specifies each transaction in the state diagram in detail. The state machine diagram can be used in conjunction with the content in sections 3.1.1 through 3.1.7 to gain a complete understanding of the client role.

#### 3.1.1 Abstract Data Model

This section describes a conceptual model of possible data organization that an implementation maintains to participate in this protocol. The described organization is provided to facilitate the explanation of how the protocol behaves. This document does not mandate that implementations adhere to this model as long as their external behavior is consistent with what is described in this document.

The following variable is internal to the client implementation and is not sent to the server.

**AUTH\_STATE:** The client uses this variable to store its current state. The various states in which the client can be are as follows:

- 1. send not received
- 2. negotiate data sent
- 3. authenticate\_data\_sent
- 4. authentication complete

send\_not\_received indicates the start state, and authentication\_complete indicates the end state. Negotiate\_data\_sent and authenticate\_data\_sent are intermediate states. Section 3.1.5 specifies how AUTH\_STATE is used in the context of the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol.

#### **3.1.2 Timers**

The client does not use any timers.

### 3.1.3 Initialization

The Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol is not a protocol by itself; rather, it is part of the Telnet Protocol (as specified in <a href="[RFC854]">[RFC854]</a>). Therefore, no separate protocol initialization is required.

The client implementation MUST set AUTH\_STATE, which it uses to track its internal state to **send\_not\_received**.

## 3.1.4 Higher-Layer Triggered Events

The client does not use any higher-layer triggered events.

## 3.1.5 Message Processing Events and Sequencing Rules

The Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol is driven by a series of message exchanges between a Telnet server and a Telnet client. The client response to an incoming message depends on the Command Type (as specified in [RFC2941]) and the NTLM\_CommandCode field (as specified in section 2.2.2) of the incoming message.

## 3.1.5.1 Receiving Any Message

## 3.1.5.1.1 Verifying Value of AuthenticationType Field

Unless specifically noted in a subsequent section in this document, the client implementation MUST verify that the **AuthenticationType** field has the value 0x0F, which corresponds to NTLM authentication. Messages with the **AuthenticationType** field set to a value other than 0x0F MUST NOT be processed by this protocol.

#### 3.1.5.1.2 Internal State

The expected value of AUTH\_STATE for each message is specified in subsequent sections of this document. An incoming message for which the current AUTH\_STATE does not match the expected state is an out-of-sequence message. The subsequent sections in this document specify how the client responds to out-of-sequence messages.

#### 3.1.5.2 Receiving a SEND Command

Expected AUTH\_STATE: send\_not\_received

On receiving the <u>SEND</u> command from the server, the client MUST send an IS command to the server and set AUTH\_STATE to **negotiate\_data\_sent**. The client MUST set the fields of the <u>IS</u> command message as follows:

- 1. **AuthenticationType** set to 0x0F (NTLM).
- 2. **Modifier** set to 0x00.
- 3. **NTLM\_CommandCode** set to NTLM\_NEGOTIATE.
- 4. **NTLM DataSize** set to the size of **NTLM Data** in number of bytes.
- 5. **NTLM\_BufferType** set to 0x00000002.
- 6. **NTLM\_Data** set to NTLM NEGOTIATE\_MESSAGE as received from the local NTLM software. How to obtain an NTLM NEGOTIATE\_MESSAGE is specified in <a href="mailto:[MS-NLMP]">[MS-NLMP]</a>.

If the AUTH\_STATE is not equal to **send\_not\_received** when the client receives a SEND command, the client SHOULD treat this as an error condition and take an appropriate implementation-dependent action. <3>

# 3.1.5.3 Receiving a REPLY Command

On receiving a <u>REPLY</u> command, the client MUST process the message based on the value of the **NTLM\_CommandCode** in the REPLY command received from the server.

## 3.1.5.3.1 Receiving the NTLM\_CHALLENGE REPLY Command

Expected AUTH\_STATE: negotiate\_data\_sent

A <u>REPLY</u> command with **NTLM\_CommandCode** set to NTLM\_CHALLENGE indicates that the server has sent an NTLM CHALLENGE MESSAGE.

On receiving this message, a client MUST call the appropriate local NTLM protocol function for processing the NTLM CHALLENGE MESSAGE.

If the NTLM CHALLENGE\_MESSAGE is a valid NTLM challenge message, as specified in [MS-NLMP], the local NTLM protocol function passes an NTLM AUTHENTICATE\_MESSAGE back to the client. If message processing is successful, the client MUST continue, as specified in section 3.1.5.3.1.1.

The local NTLM protocol function passes an implementation-defined failure error code back to the client if the NTLM CHALLENGE\_MESSAGE is not valid. The Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol client MUST NOT distinguish between different failure error codes. The client MUST treat all failure error codes identically. If message processing is unsuccessful, the client MUST continue, as specified in section 3.1.5.3.1.2.

Neither the mechanism for returning the NTLM\_AUTHENTICATE\_MESSAGE nor the mechanism for returning a failure error code is defined by the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol. These mechanisms are defined by the implementation of the NTLM protocol in use on the client.

#### 3.1.5.3.1.1 NTLM Software Returns Success

The client MUST send an <u>IS</u> command to the server, and MUST set AUTH\_STATE to **authenticate\_data\_sent**. The client MUST set the fields of the IS command message as follows:

- 1. **AuthenticationType** set to 0x0F (NTLM).
- 2. **Modifier** set to 0x00.
- 3. **NTLM\_CommandCode** set to NTLM\_AUTHENTICATE.
- 4. **NTLM DataSize** set to the size of **NTLM Data** in number of bytes.
- 5. **NTLM\_BufferType** set to 0x00000002.
- 6. **NTLM\_Data** set to NTLM AUTHENTICATE\_MESSAGE passed from the local NTLM software. How to get the NTLM AUTHENTICATE\_MESSAGE is specified in <a href="MS-NLMP">[MS-NLMP]</a>.

If the AUTH\_STATE is not equal to **negotiate\_data\_sent**, the client SHOULD treat this as an error condition, and then take an appropriate action most suitable for the implementation. <4>

### 3.1.5.3.1.2 NTLM Software Returns Failure

This indicates an error situation, and the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol does not specify or recommend any action. An implementation can take any appropriate action. <5>

## 3.1.5.3.2 Receiving the NTLM\_ACCEPT REPLY Command

Expected AUTH\_STATE: authenticate\_data\_sent

A <u>REPLY</u> command with **NTLM\_CommandCode** set to NTLM\_ACCEPT indicates that the server has successfully authenticated the client. This command marks the end of the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol.

If the client's AUTH\_STATE is equal to **authenticate\_data\_sent** when it receives this message, the client MUST set AUTH\_STATE to **authentication\_complete**, and MUST proceed with negotiation for other options, as specified in [RFC855].

# 3.1.5.3.3 Receiving the NTLM\_REJECT REPLY Command

Expected AUTH\_STATE: authenticate\_data\_sent

A <u>REPLY</u> command with **NTLM\_CommandCode** set to NTLM\_REJECT indicates that the server has failed to authenticate the client by using NTLM. This command marks the end of the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol.

If the client's AUTH\_STATE is equal to **authenticate\_data\_sent**, the client MUST set AUTH\_STATE to **authentication\_complete**, and MUST proceed with negotiation for other options, as specified in [RFC855].<7>

If the AUTH\_STATE is not equal to **authenticate\_data\_sent**, the client SHOULD treat this as an error condition, and then take an appropriate action most suitable for the implementation. <8>

#### 3.1.6 Timer Events

The client does not use any timer events.

#### 3.1.7 Other Local Events

The client does not use any local events.

## 3.2 Server Details

The following state diagram illustrates the activities of the server during Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol processing. The start state is the start of Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol message exchanges, and the end state marks the completion of Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol message exchanges.




Figure 5: Server activity during Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol processing

- 1. **will\_authenticate\_not\_received** (start state): This state indicates that the server has not received an IAC WILL AUTHENTICATION command from the client. The IAC WILL AUTHENTICATION command is specified in [RFC2941].
- 2. **send\_command\_sent:** This state indicates that the server, in response to an IAC WILL AUTHENTICATION command from the client, has sent a SEND command.
- 3. **challenge\_data\_sent:** This state indicates that the server, in response to an <u>IS</u> command from the client, has sent a REPLY command with NTLM CHALLENGE\_MESSAGE.
- 4. **authentication\_complete** (end state): This state indicates the completion of Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol message exchanges.

The actions that the server takes in response to an incoming message from the client are specified in section 3.2.5.

This state diagram is included for explanatory purposes only. Implementations are not required to use the same state names as used in the diagram. Section 3.2.5 specifies each transaction in the state

diagram in detail. The state machine diagram can be used in conjunction with content in sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.7 to gain a complete understanding of the server role.

#### 3.2.1 Abstract Data Model

This section describes a conceptual model of possible data organization that an implementation maintains to participate in this protocol. The described organization is provided to facilitate the explanation of how the protocol behaves. This document does not mandate that implementations adhere to this model as long as their external behavior is consistent with what is described in this document.

The following variable is internal to the server implementation and is not sent to the client.

**AUTH\_STATE:** The server uses this variable to store its current state. The various states in which the server can be are as follows:

- will\_authenticate\_not\_received
- 2. send command sent
- 3. challenge\_data\_sent
- 4. authentication\_complete

will\_authenticate\_not\_received denotes the start state, and authentication\_complete denotes the end state. send\_command\_sent and challenge\_data\_sent are intermediate states.

Section 3.2.5 specifies how AUTH\_STATE is used in the context of the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol.

#### **3.2.2 Timers**

The server does not use any timers.

#### 3.2.3 Initialization

The Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol is not a protocol by itself; rather, it is part of the Telnet Protocol (as specified in <a href="[RFC854]">[RFC854]</a>). Therefore, no separate initialization is required.

The server implementation MUST set AUTH\_STATE (which it uses to track its internal state) to **will\_authenticate\_not\_received**.

# 3.2.4 Higher-Layer Triggered Events

The server does not use any higher-layer triggered events.

### 3.2.5 Message Processing Events and Sequencing Rules

The Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol is driven by a series of message exchanges between a Telnet server and a Telnet client. The server response to an incoming message depends on the Command Type (as specified in <a href="[RFC2941]">[RFC2941]</a>) and the NTLM\_CommandCode field (as specified in section <a href="2.2.2">2.2</a>) of the incoming message.

#### 3.2.5.1 Receiving Any Message

## 3.2.5.1.1 Verifying Value of AuthenticationType Field

Unless specifically noted in a subsequent section in this document, the server implementation MUST verify that the **AuthenticationType** field has the value 0x0F, which corresponds to NTLM authentication. Messages with the **AuthenticationType** field set to a value other than 0x0F MUST NOT be processed by this protocol.

#### 3.2.5.1.2 Internal State

The expected value of AUTH\_STATE for each message is specified in subsequent sections in this document. An incoming message for which the current AUTH\_STATE does not match the expected state is an out-of-sequence message. The subsequent sections in this document specify how the server responds to out-of-sequence messages.

## 3.2.5.2 Receiving an IAC WILL AUTHENTICATION Command

Expected AUTH\_STATE: will\_authenticate\_not\_received

On receiving the IAC WILL AUTHENTICATION command from the client, the server MUST send a <u>SEND</u> command to the client and set AUTH\_STATE to **send\_command\_sent**. The server MUST set the fields of the SEND command message as follows:

- 1. **AuthenticationType** set to 0x0F (NTLM).
- 2. **Modifier** set to 0x00.

The IAC WILL AUTHENTICATION command is specified in <a href="[RFC2941">[RFC2941]</a>. This document specifies the response that a server makes in the context of the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol only. Details about how to handle an out-of-sequence IAC WILL AUTHENTICATION command are specified in <a href="[RFC855]">[RFC2941]</a>.

## 3.2.5.3 Receiving an IS Command

On receiving an  $\underline{\text{IS}}$  command, the server MUST process the message based on the value of the  $\textbf{NTLM\_CommandCode}$  in the IS command received from the client.

# 3.2.5.3.1 Receiving the NTLM\_NEGOTIATE IS Command

Expected AUTH\_STATE: send\_command\_sent

An  $\underline{IS}$  command with  ${\bf NTLM\_CommandCode}$  set to NTLM\_NEGOTIATE indicates that the client has sent NTLM NEGOTIATE MESSAGE.

On receiving this message, the server MUST call the appropriate local NTLM protocol function for processing the NTLM NEGOTIATE\_MESSAGE.

If the NTLM NEGOTIATE\_MESSAGE is a valid NTLM negotiate message, as specified in [MS-NLMP], the local NTLM protocol function returns an NTLM CHALLENGE MESSAGE.

The local NTLM protocol implementation returns a failure error code if the NTLM NEGOTIATE\_MESSAGE is not valid. The server's response must depend on the error code returned by the local NTLM software.

Neither the mechanism for returning the NTLM CHALLENGE\_MESSAGE nor the mechanism for returning a failure error code is defined by the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol. These mechanisms are defined by the implementation of the NTLM protocol in use on the client.

### 3.2.5.3.1.1 NTLM Software Returns Success

The server MUST send a <u>REPLY</u> command to the client, and MUST set AUTH\_STATE to challenge\_data\_sent. The server MUST set the fields of the REPLY command as follows:

- 1. **AuthenticationType** set to 0x0F (NTLM).
- 2. **Modifier** set to 0x00.
- 3. **NTLM\_CommandCode** set to NTLM\_CHALLENGE.
- 4. **NTLM\_DataSize** set to the size of **NTLM Data** in number of bytes.
- 5. **NTLM\_BufferType** set to 0x00000002.
- 6. **NTLM\_Data** set to NTLM CHALLENGE\_MESSAGE passed from the local NTLM software. Details about how to get the NTLM CHALLENGE MESSAGE are specified in [MS-NLMP].

#### 3.2.5.3.1.2 NTLM Software Returns Failure

The server MUST send a <u>REPLY</u> command, and MUST set its AUTH\_STATE to **authentication\_complete**. The server MUST set the fields of the REPLY command as follows:

- 1. **AuthenticationType** set to 0x0F (NTLM).
- 2. **Modifier** set to 0x00.
- 3. NTLM\_CommandCode set to NTLM REJECT.

## 3.2.5.3.2 Receiving the NTLM\_AUTHENTICATE IS Command

Expected AUTH\_STATE: challenge\_data\_sent

On receiving an <u>IS</u> command [**NTLM\_CommandCode** = NTLM\_AUTHENTICATE], the server MUST call the local NTLM protocol function for processing the NTLM AUTHENTICATE\_MESSAGE. The server MUST then send a REPLY command to the client, and MUST set AUTH\_STATE to **authentication\_complete**. The server MUST set the fields of the REPLY command based on the return value from the local NTLM protocol function, as specified in sections <u>3.2.5.3.2.1</u> and <u>3.2.5.3.2.2</u>.

Neither the mechanism for returning the NTLM\_AUTHENTICATE message nor the mechanisms for returning or detecting a failure error code are defined by the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol. These mechanisms are defined by the implementation of the NTLM protocol in use on the server. The server implementation can use any NTLM software.

## 3.2.5.3.2.1 NTLM Software Returns Success

The server MUST set the fields of the REPLY command as follows:

- 1. **AuthenticationType** set to 0x0F (NTLM).
- 2. **Modifier** set to 0x00.
- 3. **NTLM\_CommandCode** set to NTLM\_ACCEPT.

#### 3.2.5.3.2.2 NTLM Software Returns Failure

The server MUST set the fields of the **REPLY** command as follows:

- 1. **AuthenticationType** set to 0x0F (NTLM).
- 2. **Modifier** set to 0x00.
- 3. **NTLM\_CommandCode** set to NTLM\_REJECT.

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# 3.2.6 Timer Events

The server does not use any timer events.

# 3.2.7 Other Local Events

The server does not use any local events.

# 4 Protocol Examples

The following section describes operations used in a common scenario to illustrate the function of the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol.

## 4.1 Telnet Client Successfully Authenticating to a Telnet Server

This section illustrates the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol with an example scenario in which a Telnet client successfully authenticates to a Telnet server.




Figure 6: Telnet client authenticating Telnet server

The client sends an IAC WILL AUTHENTICATION command to the server. This command is defined in <a href="MRFC2941">[RFC2941]</a> and does not carry any Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol-specific data. It is included in this example to provide a better understanding.

The server sends the  $\underline{\text{SEND}}$  command with AuthenticationType=0x0F. AuthenticationType 0x0F corresponds to NTLM.

Sample Frame:

```
+ Ethernet: Etype = Internet IP (IPv4)
+ Ipv4: Next Protocol = TCP, Packet ID = 52505, Total IP Length = 60
+ Tcp: Flags=...PA..., SrcPort=Telnet(23), DstPort=1827, Len=8,
  Seq=4209081200 - 4209081208, Ack=3503001584, Win=65532 (scale factor
  0) = 0
- Telnet: To Client, DstPort = 0x723
  - Telcmd: IAC SB (START OF SUBNEGOTIATION PARAMETERS)
     Command: IAC SB (START OF SUBNEGOTIATION PARAMETERS)
   - AUTH: AUTHENTICATION OPTION SEND
     OptionCode: AUTHENTICATION OPTION
      SubCode: SEND
      AuthenticationType: NTLM
    - Modifier: 0x0, ENCRYPT OFF
                      (0.....) AUTH CLIENT TO SERVER
      AuthWhoMask:
       AuthHowMask:
                      (.0....) AUTH HOW ONE WAY
       EncryptMask3: (..0....)
       IniCredFwdMask: (...0....)INI CRED FWD OFF
       EncryptMask5: (....0...)
                      (....000)
       Unused:
     EndCommand: IAC SE (END OF SUBNEGOTIATION PARAMETERS)
```

The client queries the local NTLM software for NTLM NEGOTIATE\_MESSAGE, encapsulates it in an IS packet, sets various fields (see the following), and sends it to the server.

AuthenticationType = 0x0F

Modifier = 0x00

NTLM CommandCode = NTLM NEGOTIATE

NTLM DataSize = size of NTLM NEGOTIATE MESSAGE

 $NTLM_BufferType = 0x00000002$ 

NTLM\_Data = NTLM NEGOTIATE\_MESSAGE

Sample Frame:

```
+ Ethernet: Etype = Internet IP (IPv4)
+ Ipv4: Next Protocol = TCP, Packet ID = 36869, Total IP Length = 130
+ Tcp: Flags=...PA..., SrcPort=1827, DstPort=Telnet(23), Len=78,
  Seg=3503001590 - 3503001668, Ack=4209081208, Win=64232 (scale factor
 0) = 0
- Telnet: To Server, SrcPort = 0x723
  - Telcmd: IAC SB (START OF SUBNEGOTIATION PARAMETERS)
     Command: IAC SB (START OF SUBNEGOTIATION PARAMETERS)
   - AUTH: AUTHENTICATION OPTION IS
      OptionCode: AUTHENTICATION OPTION
      SubCode: IS
      {\tt AuthenticationType: NTLM}
    - Modifier: 0x0,ENCRYPT OFF
      AuthWhoMask: (0.....) AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER
       AuthHowMask:
                       (.0.....) AUTH HOW ONE WAY
       EncryptMask3: (..0....)
       {\tt IniCredFwdMask: (...0....) INI CRED FWD OFF}
       EncryptMask5: (....0...)
                       (....000)
      Unused:
    - AuthData:
       NTLMCommandCode: NTLM NEGOTIATE
       NTLMDataSize: 40 (0x28)
      NTLMBufferType: 2 (0x2)
     - NTLMData:
      + ntlmssp: NTLM NEGOTIATE MESSAGE
```

The server passes the NTLM NEGOTIATE\_MESSAGE that it received from the client to the local NTLM software. The server then sends a REPLY command with the NTLM CHALLENGE\_MESSAGE got from the local NTLM software encapsulated and various fields set as follows.

```
AuthenticationType = 0x0F
```

Modifier = 0x00

NTLM CommandCode = NTLM CHALLENGE

NTLM\_DataSize = size of NTLM CHALLENGE\_MESSAGE

 $NTLM_BufferType = 0x00000002$ 

NTLM\_Data = NTLM CHALLENGE\_MESSAGE

The following is a Sample Frame.

```
+ Ethernet: Etype = Internet IP (IPv4)
 Ipv4: Next Protocol = TCP, Packet ID = 52509, Total IP Length = 344
+ Tcp: Flags=...PA..., SrcPort=Telnet(23), DstPort=1827, Len=292,
 Seq=4209081208 - 4209081500, Ack=3503001668, Win=65448 (scale factor
 0) = 0
- Telnet: To Client, DstPort = 0x723
  - Telcmd: IAC SB (START OF SUBNEGOTIATION PARAMETERS)
    Command: IAC SB (START OF SUBNEGOTIATION PARAMETERS)
   - AUTH: AUTHENTICATION OPTION REPLY
      OptionCode: AUTHENTICATION OPTION
      SubCode: REPLY
     AuthenticationType: NTLM
    - Modifier: 0x0,ENCRYPT OFF
      AuthWhoMask: (0.....) AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER
      AuthHowMask: (.0....)AUTH_HOW_ONE_WAY EncryptMask3: (.0....)
      IniCredFwdMask: (...0....)INI CRED FWD OFF
       EncryptMask5: (....0...)
                       (....000)
      Unused:
    - AuthData:
      NTLMCommandCode: NTLM CHALLENGE
      NTLMDataSize: 240 (0xF0)
      NTLMBufferType: 2 (0x2)
     - NTLMData:
     + ntlmssp: NTLM CHALLENGE MESSAGE
    EndCommand: IAC SE (END OF SUBNEGOTIATION PARAMETERS)
```

The client passes the NTLM CHALLENGE\_MESSAGE that it received from the server to the local NTLM software. The client then sends an IS command with NTLM AUTHENTICATE\_MESSAGE got from the local NTLM software encapsulated and various fields set as follows.

AuthenticationType = 0x0F

Modifier = 0x00

NTLM\_CommandCode = NTLM\_AUTHENTICATE

NTLM DataSize = size of NTLM AUTHENTICATE MESSAGE

 $NTLM_BufferType = 0x00000002$ 

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## NTLM\_Data = NTLM AUTHENTICATE\_MESSAGE

The following is a Sample Frame.

```
+ Ethernet: Etype = Internet IP (IPv4)
+ Ipv4: Next Protocol = TCP, Packet ID = 36871, Total IP Length = 294
+ Tcp: Flags=...PA..., SrcPort=1827, DstPort=Telnet(23), Len=242,
 Seq=3503001712 - 3503001954, Ack=4209081500, Win=64159 (scale factor
- Telnet: To Server, SrcPort = 0x723
  - Telcmd: IAC SB (START OF SUBNEGOTIATION PARAMETERS)
    Command: IAC SB (START OF SUBNEGOTIATION PARAMETERS)
   - AUTH: AUTHENTICATION OPTION IS
      OptionCode: AUTHENTICATION OPTION
      SubCode: IS
     AuthenticationType: NTLM
    - Modifier: 0x0,ENCRYPT_OFF
      AuthWhoMask: (0.....) AUTH CLIENT TO SERVER
                      (.0....) AUTH HOW ONE WAY
      AuthHowMask:
      EncryptMask3: (..0....)
       IniCredFwdMask: (...0....)INI_CRED_FWD_OFF
      EncryptMask5: (...0...)
Unused: (....000)
      Unused:
    - AuthData:
      NTLMCommandCode: NTLM AUTHENTICATE
      NTLMDataSize: 186 (0xBA)
      NTLMBufferType: 2 (0x2)
     - NTLMData:
      + ntlmssp: NTLM AUTHENTICATE MESSAGE
     EndCommand: IAC SE (END OF SUBNEGOTIATION PARAMETERS)
```

The server passes the NTLM AUTHENTICATE\_MESSAGE to the local NTLM software. The server then sends a REPLY command to the client with various fields set as follows.

AuthenticationType = 0x0F

Modifier = 0x00

NTLM\_CommandCode = NTLM\_ACCEPT

Sample Frame:

```
+ Ethernet: Etype = Internet IP (IPv4)
+ Ipv4: Next Protocol = TCP, Packet ID = 52520, Total IP Length = 64
+ Tcp: Flags=...PA..., SrcPort=Telnet(23), DstPort=1827, Len=12,
 Seq=4209081500 - 4209081512, Ack=3503001954, Win=65162 (scale factor
 0) = 0
- Telnet: To Client, DstPort = 0x723
  - Telcmd: IAC SB (START OF SUBNEGOTIATION PARAMETERS)
    Command: IAC SB (START OF SUBNEGOTIATION PARAMETERS)
  - AUTH: AUTHENTICATION OPTION REPLY
     OptionCode: AUTHENTICATION OPTION
     SubCode: REPLY
     AuthenticationType: NTLM
    - Modifier: 0x0, ENCRYPT OFF
      AuthWhoMask: (0.....) AUTH CLIENT TO SERVER
      AuthHowMask:
                      (.0....) AUTH_HOW_ONE_WAY
      EncryptMask3: (..0....)
      IniCredFwdMask: (...0....)INI_CRED_FWD_OFF
      EncryptMask5: (....0...)
      Unused:
                      (....000)
    - AuthData:
      NTLMCommandCode: NTLM ACCEPT
```

The actual value of NTLM\_CommandCode depends on the return value given by the local NTLM software after it processes the NTLM AUTHENTICATE\_MESSAGE. In this example, it is assumed that the NTLM software returns success.

Release: October 16, 2015

# **5** Security

The following sections specify security considerations for implementers of the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol.

# **5.1 Security Considerations for Implementers**

Implementers should be aware of the security considerations of using NTLM authentication. Information about the security considerations of using NTLM authentication is specified in <a href="MS-NLMP">[MS-NLMP]</a> section 5.

## **5.2 Index of Security Parameters**

Security parameter	Section
NTLM	<u>2</u> and <u>3</u>

# 6 Appendix A: Product Behavior

The information in this specification is applicable to the following Microsoft products or supplemental software. References to product versions include released service packs.

Note: Some of the information in this section is subject to change because it applies to a preliminary product version, and thus may differ from the final version of the software when released. All behavior notes that pertain to the preliminary product version contain specific references to it as an aid to the reader.

- Windows 2000 operating system
- Windows XP operating system
- Windows Server 2003 operating system
- Windows Vista operating system
- Windows Home Server server software
- Windows Server 2008 operating system
- Windows 7 operating system
- Windows Server 2008 R2 operating system
- Windows 8 operating system
- Windows Server 2012 operating system
- Windows 8.1 operating system
- Windows Server 2012 R2 operating system
- Windows 10 operating system
- Windows Server 2016 Technical Preview operating system

Exceptions, if any, are noted below. If a service pack or Quick Fix Engineering (QFE) number appears with the product version, behavior changed in that service pack or QFE. The new behavior also applies to subsequent service packs of the product unless otherwise specified. If a product edition appears with the product version, behavior is different in that product edition.

Unless otherwise specified, any statement of optional behavior in this specification that is prescribed using the terms SHOULD or SHOULD NOT implies product behavior in accordance with the SHOULD or SHOULD NOT prescription. Unless otherwise specified, the term MAY implies that the product does not follow the prescription.

<1> Section 1.5: Windows Telnet server and Telnet client use Security Support Provider Interface (SSPI) to obtain and process NTLM messages. For more information about SSPI, see [SSPI].

<2> Section 2.2.2: Though the Telnet: NTLM Authentication Protocol does not specify why or how the NTLM\_BufferType field is processed, Microsoft Windows Telnet server and client use the value of this field to fill the BufferType field of the SecBuffer structure. For more information on BufferType and the SecBuffer structure, see [SSPI]. The value 0x00000002 corresponds to SECBUFFER\_TOKEN buffer type. The Microsoft Windows Telnet client and Telnet server implementations set the NTLM\_BufferType field to 0x00000002.

<3> Section 3.1.5.2: When a Microsoft Windows Telnet client encounters this error condition, it sends an IS command message with the **AuthenticationType** field set to 0x00, which corresponds to

**AuthenticationType** NULL. Such an IS packet indicates to the server that Telnet Authentication Option (as specified in [RFC2941]) cannot be used.

<4> Section 3.1.5.3.1.1: When the Microsoft Windows Telnet client encounters this error condition, it ignores the message packet and takes no action.

<5> Section 3.1.5.3.1.2: When the Microsoft Windows Telnet client encounters this error condition, it sends an IS packet with the **AuthenticationType** field set to 0x00, which corresponds to **AuthenticationType** NULL. This IS packet indicates to the server that the Telnet Authentication Option cannot be used.

<7> Section 3.1.5.3.3: The Microsoft Windows Telnet server follows the REPLY command [NTLM\_CommandCode = NTLM\_REJECT] with Telnet data that contains a string describing the reason for NTLM authentication failure followed by a string for password authentication. Details about how to handle Telnet data are specified in [RFC854].

<8> Section 3.1.5.3.3: When the Microsoft Windows Telnet client encounters this error condition, it processes the message as it would if the message arrived in proper sequence.

# 7 Change Tracking

No table of changes is available. The document is either new or has had no changes since its last release.

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