[MS-OAPXBC]:

OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions for Broker Clients

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Revision Summary

Date	Revision History	Revision Class	Comments
10/16/2015	1.0	New	Released new document.
7/14/2016	2.0	Major	Significantly changed the technical content.
9/26/2016	3.0	Major	Significantly changed the technical content.
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1 Introduction

The OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions for Broker Clients (OAPXBC) specify extensions to the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework, specified in [RFC6749], that allow a high privilege broker client to obtain access tokens on behalf of calling clients and how these tokens are accessed through the browser.

Sections 1.5, 1.8, 1.9, 2, and 3 of this specification are normative. All other sections and examples in this specification are informative.

1.1 Glossary

This document uses the following terms:

- Active Directory: The Windows implementation of a general-purpose directory service, which uses LDAP as its primary access protocol. Active Directory stores information about a variety of objects in the network such as user accounts, computer accounts, groups, and all related credential information used by Kerberos [MS-KILE]. Active Directory is either deployed as Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) or Active Directory Lightweight Directory Services (AD LDS), which are both described in [MS-ADOD]: Active Directory Protocols Overview.
- Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS): A directory service (DS) implemented by a domain controller (DC). The DS provides a data store for objects that is distributed across multiple DCs. The DCs interoperate as peers to ensure that a local change to an object replicates correctly across DCs. AD DS is a deployment of Active Directory [MS-ADTS].
- **Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS)**: A Microsoft implementation of a federation services provider, which provides a security token service (STS) that can issue security tokens to a caller using various protocols such as WS-Trust, WS-Federation, and Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) version 2.0.
- **AD FS behavior level**: A specification of the functionality available in an AD FS server. Possible values such as AD_FS_BEHAVIOR_LEVEL_1 and AD_FS_BEHAVIOR_LEVEL_2 are described in [MS-OAPX].
- **AD FS server**: See authorization server in [RFC6749].
- **base64 encoding**: A binary-to-text encoding scheme whereby an arbitrary sequence of bytes is converted to a sequence of printable ASCII characters, as described in [RFC4648].
- **Certificate Management Messages over CMS (CMC)**: An internet standard for transport mechanisms for CMS [RFC2797].
- **Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)**: A public standard that defines how to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message content, as specified in [RFC3852].
- domain controller (DC): The service, running on a server, that implements Active Directory, or the server hosting this service. The service hosts the data store for objects and interoperates with other DCs to ensure that a local change to an object replicates correctly across all DCs. When Active Directory is operating as Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS), the DC contains full NC replicas of the configuration naming context (config NC), schema naming context (schema NC), and one of the domain NCs in its forest. If the AD DS DC is a global catalog server (GC server), it contains partial NC replicas of the remaining domain NCs in its forest. For more information, see [MS-AUTHSOD] section 1.1.1.5.2 and [MS-ADTS]. When Active Directory is operating as Active Directory Lightweight Directory Services (AD LDS), several AD LDS DCs can run on one server. When Active Directory is operating as AD DS, only one AD DS DC can run on one server. However, several AD LDS DCs can coexist with one AD DS DC on one server. The AD LDS DC contains full NC replicas of the config NC and the

- schema NC in its forest. The domain controller is the server side of Authentication Protocol Domain Support [MS-APDS].
- **JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)**: A text-based, data interchange format that is used to transmit structured data, typically in Asynchronous JavaScript + XML (AJAX) web applications, as described in [RFC7159]. The JSON format is based on the structure of ECMAScript (Jscript, JavaScript) objects.
- **JSON Web Token (JWT)**: A string representing a set of claims as a JSON object that is encoded in a JWS or JWE, enabling the claims to be digitally signed or integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and/or encrypted. For more information, see [RFC7519].
- **key**: In the registry, a node in the logical tree of the data store.
- **OAuth logon certificate request**: An OAuth request in which a resource, or relying party, acts as a client and uses a previously received access token to request an X.509 certificate. The resulting certificate represents the same identity represented by the access token.
- **public key**: One of a pair of keys used in public-key cryptography. The public key is distributed freely and published as part of a digital certificate. For an introduction to this concept, see [CRYPTO] section 1.8 and [IEEE1363] section 3.1.
- **relying party (RP)**: A web application or service that consumes security tokens issued by a security token service (STS).
- **Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)**: A string that identifies a resource. The URI is an addressing mechanism defined in Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax [RFC3986].
- **X.509**: An ITU-T standard for public key infrastructure subsequently adapted by the IETF, as specified in [RFC3280].
- **MAY, SHOULD, MUST, SHOULD NOT, MUST NOT:** These terms (in all caps) are used as defined in [RFC2119]. All statements of optional behavior use either MAY, SHOULD, or SHOULD NOT.

1.2 References

Links to a document in the Microsoft Open Specifications library point to the correct section in the most recently published version of the referenced document. However, because individual documents in the library are not updated at the same time, the section numbers in the documents may not match. You can confirm the correct section numbering by checking the Errata.

1.2.1 Normative References

We conduct frequent surveys of the normative references to assure their continued availability. If you have any issue with finding a normative reference, please contact dochelp@microsoft.com. We will assist you in finding the relevant information.

[FIPS180-2] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-2, August 2002, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2.pdf

[MS-ADA1] Microsoft Corporation, "Active Directory Schema Attributes A-L".

[MS-ADA2] Microsoft Corporation, "Active Directory Schema Attributes M".

[MS-ADSC] Microsoft Corporation, "Active Directory Schema Classes".

[MS-ADTS] Microsoft Corporation, "Active Directory Technical Specification".

[MS-KPP] Microsoft Corporation, "Key Provisioning Protocol".

[MS-OAPX] Microsoft Corporation, "OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions".

[MS-OIDCE] Microsoft Corporation, "OpenID Connect 1.0 Protocol Extensions".

[MS-WCCE] Microsoft Corporation, "Windows Client Certificate Enrollment Protocol".

[MSKB-4022723] Microsoft Corporation, "June 27, 2017 - KB4022723 (OS Build 14393.1378)", https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/4022723

[MSKB-4088889] Microsoft Corporation, "March 22, 2018 - KB4088889 (OS Build 14393.2155)", https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4088889

[OIDCCore] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and Mortimore, C., "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating errata set 1", November 2014, http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1 0.html

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997, https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119

[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000, https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818

[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006, https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648

[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, October 2012, https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749

[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and Sakimura, N., "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, May 2015, https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515

[RFC7516] Jones, M., and Hildebrand, J., "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", RFC 7516, May 2015, https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516

[RFC7519] Internet Engineering Task Force, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519

[SP800-108] National Institute of Standards and Technology., "Special Publication 800-108, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions", October 2009, https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-108/final

1.2.2 Informative References

[MSFT-CVE-2021-33781] Microsoft Corporation, "Azure AD Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability", CVE-2021-33781, July 13, 2021, https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-33781

[MSFT-CVE-2023-35348] Microsoft Corporation, "CVE-2023-35348 Security Vulnerability", CVE-2023-35348, https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-quide/vulnerability/

1.3 Overview

The OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions for Broker Clients (OAPXBC) specify extensions to the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework defined in [RFC6749]. These extensions allow a high privilege broker client to obtain access tokens on behalf of calling clients and how these tokens are accessed through the browser.

Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) implements parts of the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework defined in [RFC6749] as well as the extensions described in [MS-OAPX]. In addition to these, AD FS also implements extensions to enable broker clients to retrieve tokens from an authorization server on behalf of other clients. When no **AD FS behavior level** is specified, the details apply to all AD FS behavior levels.

Note: Throughout this specification, the fictitious names "client.example.com" and "server.example.com" are used as they are used in [RFC6749].

1.4 Relationship to Other Protocols

The OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions for Broker Clients specify extensions to the industry standard OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework that is defined in [RFC6749] and the extensions described in [MSOAPX]. These extensions are therefore dependent on the OAuth 2.0 protocol and the extensions in [MSOAPX] and use HTTPS [RFC2818] as the underlying transport protocol. The following figure shows the relationships of these RFCs and protocols.




Figure 1: Protocol dependency

1.5 Prerequisites/Preconditions

The OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions for Broker Clients define extensions to [RFC6749] and <a href="[MS-OAPX]. A prerequisite to implementing the OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions is that the REQUIRED parts of [RFC6749] have been implemented on the **AD FS server**.

These extensions also assume that if the OAuth 2.0 client requests authorization for a particular resource, or **relying party**, secured by the AD FS server, the client knows the identifier of that resource. These extensions also assume that the OAuth 2.0 client knows its own client identifier and all relevant client authentication information if it is a confidential client.

The client runs on a device for which there is a corresponding msDS-Device object in Active Directory with the following additional requirements:

- The client has access to the private key of a device certificate (defined in section 3.1.1). The
 public portion of the device certificate is stored in the altSecurityIdentities attribute of the
 device's msDS-Device object in Active Directory.
- The client has access to the private key of a **session transport key (STK)** (defined in section 3.1.1). The public portion of the STK is stored in the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of the device's msDS-Device object in Active Directory.

The OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions for Broker Clients assume that they, the OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions [MS-OAPX], and the OpenID Connect 1.0 Protocol Extensions [MS-OIDCE], if being used, are all be running on the same AD FS server.

1.6 Applicability Statement

The OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions for Broker Clients are supported by all **AD FS servers** that are at an **AD FS behavior level** of AD_FS_BEHAVIOR_LEVEL_2 or higher. See [MS-OAPX] section 3.2.1.1 for the formal definition of AD FS behavior level.

1.7 Versioning and Capability Negotiation

This document covers versioning issues in the following areas:

Supported Transports: The OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions for Broker Clients support only HTTPS [RFC2818] as the transport protocol.

Protocol Versions: The OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions for Broker Clients do not define protocol versions.

Localization: The OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions for Broker Clients do not return localized strings.

Capability Negotiation: The OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions for Broker Clients do not support capability negotiation.

1.8 Vendor-Extensible Fields

None.

1.9 Standards Assignments

None.

2 Messages

2.1 Transport

The HTTPS protocol [RFC2818] MUST be used as the transport.

2.2 Common Data Types

2.2.1 HTTP Headers

The messages exchanged in the OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions for Broker Clients use the following HTTP headers in addition to the existing set of standard HTTP headers.

Header	Description
<u>x-ms-</u> <u>RefreshTokenCredential</u>	This optional header can be used by the client to specify a primary refresh token when contacting the authorization endpoint.
x-ms-DeviceCredential	This optional header can be used by the client to prove the identity of the device from which the request is sent when contacting the authorization endpoint.
x-ms-SsoFlags	This optional header can be used by the client to provide the state of the automatic app sign in policy when contracting the authorization endpoint.
x-ms-SsoFlagsSubstatus	This optional header can be used by the client to provide additional information for the x-ms-SsoFlags . The value for this header MUST be base64-encoded JSON format.

2.2.1.1 x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential

The **x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential** HTTP header is optional and can be specified by the client role of the OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions for Broker Clients. This header is used to pass a previously obtained primary refresh token to the authorization endpoint of the **AD FS server**. The primary refresh token can be used by the server to authenticate the user and the device on which the client runs when processing the authorization request.

The value of the **x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential** HTTP header MUST be a signed **JWT**. The signed JWT format is defined in [RFC7519]. The format for the **x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential** header is as follows.

```
 \begin{array}{lll} {\tt String} & {\tt *(\$x20-7E)} \\ {\tt x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential} & {\tt = String} \end{array}
```

2.2.1.2 x-ms-DeviceCredential

The x-ms-DeviceCredential HTTP header is optional and can be specified by the client role of the OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions for Broker Clients. This header is used to authenticate the device on which the client is running.

The value of the **x-ms-DeviceCredential** HTTP header MUST be a signed **JWT**. The signed JWT format is defined in [RFC7519]. The format for the **x-ms-DeviceCredential** header is as follows.

```
String = *(%x20-7E)
```

2.2.1.3 x-ms-SsoFlags

The **x-ms-SsoFlags** HTTP header is optional. This header is used to provide the state of the automatic app sign in policy on the device which the client is running.

The value of the **x-ms-SsoFlags** HTTP header is strings. The format for the **x-ms-SsoFlags** header is as follows.

```
x-ms-SsoFlags = \langle Flag 1 \rangle | \langle Flag 2 \rangle | \langle Flag 3 \rangle
```

2.2.1.4 x-ms-SsoFlagsSubstatus

The **x-ms-SsoFlagsSubstatus** HTTP header is optional. This header is used to provide additional information for the **x-ms-SsoFlags** policy state.

The value of the **x-ms-SsoFlagsSubstatus** HTTP header MUST be **base64-encoded JSON**. The format for the **x-ms-SsoFlagsSubstatus** header is as follows.

```
x-ms-SsoFlagsSubstatus = Based64Encoded({"<key1>":"<value1>", "<key2>:"<value2>"})
```

2.2.2 Data Structures

The following table summarizes the set of common data structures that are defined by this specification.

Data structure	Section	Description
krctx	2.2.2.1	OPTIONAL. The OAuth 2.0 client includes this parameter in the POST body of a request when the OAuth logon certificate request needs to be authorized.

2.2.2.1 krctx

```
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant_type={grant_type}&client_id={client_id}&redirect_uri={redirect_uri}&requested_token_use
={requested_token_use}&assertion={assertion}&csr={csr}&csr_type={csr_type}&krctx={krctx}
```

Note: For details about the *requested_token_use* and *assertion* parameters, see [MS-OAPX] section 2.2.3.

OPTIONAL

The *krctx* parameter is optional and can be specified by the client role of the OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions for Broker Clients in the POST body when making a request to the token endpoint (section 3.1.5.1). The client provides a **base64-encoded JSON** value in the *krctx* parameter when making an **OAuth logon certificate request**.

The **AD FS server** ignores this parameter unless its **AD FS behavior level** is AD_FS_BEHAVIOR_LEVEL_3 or higher ([MS-OAPX] section 3.2.1.1) and the AD FS server is capable of processing the parameter, as indicated by the value "winhello_cert_kr" being included in the **capabilities** field of the OpenID Provider Metadata ([MS-OIDCE] section 2.2.3.2).<1>

The format for the *krctx* parameter is as follows:

```
String = *(%x20-7E)
krctx = String
```

where the value of krctx has the following structure:

```
{
    "Data": {
        "type": "string"
},
"Format": {
        "type": "integer"
},
"Version": {
        "type": "integer"
}
```

Property	Value
Data	A base64-encoded JSON Web Token (JWT) . This property is used to authorize the OAuth logon certificate request (section 3.1.5.1.4.1).
Format	MUST be set to "1".
Version	MUST be set to "1".

2.3 Directory Service Schema Elements

This protocol accesses the Directory Service schema classes and attributes that are listed in the following table(s).

For the syntax of <Class> or <Class> <Attribute> pairs, refer to one of the following:

Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) [MS-ADA1] [MS-ADA2] [MS-ADSC]

Class	Attribute
msDS-Device	altSecurityIdentities msDS-KeyCredentialLink
user	msDS-KeyCredentialLink

3 Protocol Details

3.1 OAuthBrokerExtension Client Details

The client role of the OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions for Broker Clients is the initiator of requests for access tokens on behalf of other clients. The client role also stores data that is important to these requests such as a nonce and the primary refresh token.

3.1.1 Abstract Data Model

This section describes a conceptual model of possible data organization that an implementation maintains to participate in this protocol. The described organization is provided to facilitate the explanation of how the protocol behaves. This document does not mandate that implementations adhere to this model as long as their external behavior is consistent with that described in this document.

The client role is expected to be aware of the **relying party** or resource identifier of the resource server if it requests authorization for a particular resource. See [MS-OAPX] section 3.2.5.2.1.1 for information about the *resource* parameter.

The following elements are defined by this protocol:

Client Identifier: An identifier, represented as a string, that uniquely identifies the client to the server.

Nonce: An opaque, base64-encoded value that is provided by the server and used in requests for a primary refresh token.

Primary Refresh Token: A refresh token that the client can exchange for access tokens from the server.

Session Key: A key used to sign access token requests and decrypt access token responses. The client receives this key from the server in the response that is described in section 3.1.5.1.2.2. This key MUST be stored in a secure manner.

Device Certificate: An **X.509** certificate that represents the device on which the client runs. The client MUST have access to the private key. The altSecurityIdentities attribute of an msDS-Device object in **Active Directory** is used to store and access the public portion of the certificate.

Session Transport Key: A key used to decrypt the session key. The msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of an msDS-Device object in Active Directory is used to store and access the key. The msDS-Device object MUST be the same object in Active Directory that contains the public portion of the **Device Certificate**.

User Authentication Key: A key used to authenticate an end user. The msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of a user object in Active Directory is used to store and access the public portion of the key.

3.1.2 Timers

None.

3.1.3 Initialization

The OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions for Broker Clients do not define any special initialization requirements.

3.1.4 Higher-Layer Triggered Events

None.

3.1.5 Message Processing Events and Sequencing Rules

The resources that are accessed and manipulated by this protocol are defined in [RFC6749] and shown below for reference.

Resource	Description		
Token endpoint (/token)	For a description, see section <u>3.2.5</u> .		
Authorization endpoint (/authorize)	For a description, see section 3.2.5.		

The HTTP responses to all the HTTP methods are defined in corresponding sections of [RFC6749].

3.1.5.1 Token endpoint (/token)

The following HTTP method is allowed to be performed on this resource.

HTTP method	Description	
POST	For a description, see section 3.2.5.1.	

3.1.5.1.1 POST (Request for Nonce)

This method requests a nonce value from the server that the client then includes in a future request for a primary refresh token, as defined in section 3.1.5.1.2.

This operation is transported by an HTTP POST and can be invoked through the following URI:

/token

3.1.5.1.1.1 Request Body

The format of the request is defined in section 3.2.5.1.1.1.

3.1.5.1.1.2 Response Body

The format of the response is defined in section 3.2.5.1.1.2.

3.1.5.1.1.3 Processing Details

The nonce that is received in the response body of this request is stored in the **Nonce** abstract data model element (section 3.1.1). This nonce is used in a future request for a primary refresh token, as defined in section 3.1.5.1.2.

3.1.5.1.2 POST (Request for Primary Refresh Token)

This method requests a primary refresh token that the client can then exchange for access tokens or user authentication certificates, as defined in sections 3.1.5.1.3 and 3.1.5.1.4.

This operation is transported by an HTTP **POST** and can be invoked through the following **URI**:

3.1.5.1.2.1 Request Body

The format of the request is defined in section 3.2.5.1.2.1.

3.1.5.1.2.2 Response Body

The format of the response is defined in section 3.2.5.1.2.2.

3.1.5.1.2.3 Processing Details

Request processing:

The client uses the **Nonce** abstract data model (ADM) element value (section <u>3.1.1</u>) that it received from the server in a previous nonce request (section <u>3.1.5.1.1</u>) to populate the **request_nonce** field of the request. If using user **JSON Web Token (JWT)** authentication, as described in section <u>3.2.5.1.2.1.2</u>, the same **Nonce** should be populated as a **request_nonce** field in the JWT assertion before signing it.

Note: This feature is supported by the operating systems specified in [MSFT-CVE-2023-35348], each with its related KB article download installed.

The client signs the request JWT described in section <u>3.1.5.1.2.1</u> using the private key of the **Device Certificate** ADM element (section 3.1.1).

If using user JWT authentication as described in section 3.2.5.1.2.1.2, the client signs the **assertion** JWT using the private key of the **User Authentication Key** ADM element (section 3.1.1), and sets the **kid** field of the **assertion** JWT to the SHA-256 hash (see [FIPS180-2] section 6.2.2) of the public key of the **User Authentication Key** ADM element (section 3.1.1).

Response processing:

The client stores the **refresh_token** field of the response in the **Primary Refresh Token** ADM element (section 3.1.1).

The client decrypts the **session_key_jwe** field of the response by following the process described in [RFC7516] section 5.2 and by using the **Session Transport Key** ADM element (section 3.1.1). The client stores the decrypted key in the **Session Key** ADM element.

3.1.5.1.3 POST (Exchange Primary Refresh Token for Access Token)

This method exchanges a primary refresh token for an access token.

This operation is transported by an HTTP **POST** and can be invoked through the following **URI**:

/token

3.1.5.1.3.1 Request Body

The format of the request is defined in section 3.2.5.1.3.1.

3.1.5.1.3.2 Response Body

The format of the response is defined in section 3.2.5.1.3.2.

3.1.5.1.3.3 Processing Details

The client first requests a primary refresh token from the server as defined in sections 3.1.5.1.2 and 3.2.5.1.2. It then uses the **Primary Refresh Token** ADM element (section 3.1.1) to populate the **refresh token** field in this request for the access token.

The client derives a signing key from the **Session Key** ADM element (section 3.1.1), the constant label "AzureAD-SecureConversation", and the *ctx* value provided in the **JWT** header of the request by using the process described in [SP800-108]. The client uses this signing key to sign the request. If the capabilities field of the OpenID Provider Metadata ([MS-OIDCE] section 2.2.3.2) from the server includes the value "kdf_ver2", the client can use KDFv2 version<a><2> for deriving the **Session Key**. If the client chooses to use KDFv2, the client MUST use SHA256(ctx || assertion payload) instead of ctx as the context for deriving the signing key. The client MUST also add the JWT header field "kdf_ver" with value set to 2 to communicate that KDFv2 was used to create the derived signing key.

3.1.5.1.4 POST (Exchange Primary Refresh Token for User Authentication Certificate)

This method exchanges a primary refresh token for a user authentication certificate. <3>

This operation is transported by an HTTP **POST** and can be invoked through the following **URI**:

/token

3.1.5.1.4.1 Request Body

The format of the request is defined in section 3.2.5.1.4.1.

3.1.5.1.4.2 Response Body

The format of the response is defined in section 3.2.5.1.4.2.

3.1.5.1.4.3 Processing Details

When the client obtains the OpenID Provider Metadata from the server ([MS-OIDCE] section 2.2.3.2), it checks for the **capabilities** field. If the field exists in the metadata and includes the value "winhello_cert", the client can proceed with this request for a user authentication certificate.

The client first requests a primary refresh token from the server as defined in sections 3.1.5.1.2 and 3.2.5.1.2. It then uses the **Primary Refresh Token** ADM element (section 3.1.1) to populate the **refresh_token** field in this request for the user authentication certificate. If the capabilities field of the OpenID Provider Metadata ([MS-OIDCE] section 2.2.3.2) from the server includes the value "kdf_ver2", the client can use KDFv2 version for deriving the **Session Key**. If the client chooses to use KDFv2, the client MUST use SHA256(ctx || assertion payload) instead of ctx as the context for deriving the signing key. The client MUST also add the **JWT** header field "kdf_ver" with the value set to 2 to communicate that KDFv2 was used for creating the derived signing key.

The client constructs a **base64-encoded** PKCS #10 certificate request ([MS-WCCE] section 2.2.2.6.1) using the **User Authentication Key** ADM element (section 3.1.1), and uses it to populate the **csr** field in this request for the user authentication certificate.

In some cases, the client will have previously registered the public portion of the **key** that is stored in the **User Authentication Key** ADM element (section 3.1.1) via the Key request defined in [MS-KPP] section 3.1.5.1. In those cases, the client might have received a value in the **pctx** field of that response ([MS-KPP] section 3.1.5.1.1.2) and stored it in the **Data Store Information** ADM element of [MS-KPP] section 3.2.1. If this is true, then the client SHOULD populate the **pctx** field of this request with that value.

The client derives a signing key from the **Session Key** ADM element (section 3.1.1), the constant label "AzureAD-SecureConversation", and the ctx value provided in the JWT header of the request by using the process described in [SP800-108]. The client uses this signing key to sign the request.

If the **capabilities** field of the OpenID Provider Metadata from the server includes the value "winhello_cert_kr", the client can include the *krctx* parameter, set to a value that contains a JWT. The JWT is structured as defined in section 2.2.2.1 and contains the data defined in section 3.2.5.1.4.3. The "winhello_cert_kr" value is supported on the **AD FS server** only if its **AD FS behavior level** is AD_FS_BEHAVIOR_LEVEL_3 or higher. See section 2.2.2.1 for additional support information.

3.1.5.2 Authorization endpoint (/authorize)

As defined in [RFC6749] section 3.1 (Authorization Endpoint), the authorization endpoint on the authorization server is used to interact with the resource owner and obtain an authorization grant. The following HTTP method is allowed to be performed on this endpoint.

HTTP method	Description
<u>GET</u>	For a description, see section $3.2.5.2$.

3.1.5.2.1 GET

For the syntax and semantics of the GET method, see section 3.2.5.2.1.

The request, response, and processing details are the same as those specified in [MS-OAPX] section 3.1.5.1.1, with the following additions.

3.1.5.2.1.1 Request Body

The format of the request is defined in section 3.2.5.2.1.1.

3.1.5.2.1.2 Response Body

The response body of this method is the same as that specified in [MS-OAPX] section 3.1.5.1.1.2.

3.1.5.2.1.3 Processing Details

The processing details are the same as those specified in [MS-OAPX] section 3.1.5.1.1.3, with the following addition.

If a primary refresh token is available to the client in the **Primary Refresh Token** ADM element (section 3.1.1), the client can choose to include the token in the optional x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential HTTP header. The format of the x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential HTTP header is a signed **JWT** as defined in section 2.2.1.1, with the fields described in section 3.2.5.2.1.1.1. The client populates the header as follows:

- The client uses the **Primary Refresh Token** ADM element to populate the required **refresh_token** field of the x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential HTTP header.
- The client uses the Nonce ADM element value (section 3.1.1) that it received from the server in a
 previous nonce request (section 3.1.5.1.1) to populate the required request_nonce field of the xms-RefreshTokenCredential HTTP header.

The client derives a signing key from the **Session Key** ADM element (section 3.1.1), the constant label "AzureAD-SecureConversation", and the *ctx* value provided in the JWT header of the request by using the process described in [SP800-108]. The client uses this signing key to sign the JWT. If the capabilities field of the OpenID Provider Metadata ([MS-OIDCE] section 2.2.3.2) from the server includes the value "kdf_ver2", the client can use KDFv2 version for deriving the **Session Key**. If the client chooses to use KDFv2, the client MUST use SHA256(ctx || assertion payload) instead of ctx as

the context for deriving the signing key. The client MUST also add the JWT header field "kdf_ver" with value set to 2 to communicate that KDFv2 was used for creating the derived signing key.

If a certificate is available to the client in the **Device Certificate** ADM element (section 3.1.1), the client can include the optional x-ms-DeviceCredential HTTP header. The format of the x-ms-DeviceCredential HTTP header is a signed JWT as defined in section 2.2.1.2, with the fields described in section 3.2.5.2.1.1.2. The client populates the header as follows:

• The client uses the **Nonce** ADM element value (section 3.1.1) that it received from the server in a previous nonce request (section 3.1.5.1.1) to populate the **request_nonce** field of the request.

The client signs the request JWT described in section <u>3.1.5.1.2.1</u> using the private key of the **Device Certificate** ADM element.

Note The client can include both the x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential HTTP header and the x-ms-DeviceCredential HTTP header in a request, but the server ignores the x-ms-DeviceCredential HTTP header if the x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential HTTP header that is provided is valid.

3.1.6 Timer Events

None.

3.1.7 Other Local Events

None.

3.2 OAuthBrokerExtension Server Details

The server role of the OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions for Broker Clients corresponds to the notion of an authorization server as defined in [RFC6749] section 1.1 (Roles). The server role responds to the client's requests for a nonce, a primary refresh token, and access tokens.

3.2.1 Abstract Data Model

None.

3.2.2 Timers

None.

3.2.3 Initialization

The OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions for Broker Clients do not define any special initialization requirements.

3.2.4 Higher-Layer Triggered Events

None.

3.2.5 Message Processing Events and Sequencing Rules

The resources accessed and manipulated by this protocol are defined in <a>[RFC6749] and are shown below for reference.

Resource	Description
Token endpoint (/token)	As defined in [RFC6749] section 3.2 (Token Endpoint), the token endpoint on the authorization server is used by an OAuth 2.0 client to obtain an access token by presenting its authorization grant or refresh token.
Authorization endpoint (/authorize)	As defined in [RFC6749] section 3.1 (Authorization Endpoint), the authorization endpoint is used to interact with the resource owner and obtain an authorization grant.

The HTTP responses to all the HTTP methods are defined in corresponding sections of [RFC6749].

3.2.5.1 Token endpoint (/token)

As defined in [RFC6749] section 3.2 (Token Endpoint), the token endpoint on the **AD FS server** is used by an OAuth 2.0 client to obtain an access token by presenting its authorization grant or refresh token. The following HTTP method is allowed to be performed on this endpoint.

HTTP method	Description
POST	An access token request issued by the OAuth 2.0 client to the token endpoint of the AD FS server in accordance with the requirements of [RFC6749] section 4.1.3 (Access Token Request).

3.2.5.1.1 POST (Request for Nonce)

This method requests a nonce value from the server that the client then includes in a future request for a primary refresh token, as defined in section 3.2.5.1.2.

This operation is transported by an HTTP **POST** and can be invoked through the following **URI**:

/token

3.2.5.1.1.1 Request Body

To request a nonce, the client creates and sends the following request body.

```
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant type=srv challenge
```

3.2.5.1.1.2 Response Body

The server sends the following response body for this request.

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
{"Nonce":<nonce>}
```

The response contains a **JSON** object with one element:

Nonce (REQUIRED): An opaque, base64 URL-encoded value ([RFC4648] section 5). Padding is not required ([RFC4648] section 3.2). It is to be used by the client in a future request for a primary refresh token.

3.2.5.1.1.3 Processing Details

Generation of the **Nonce** field of the response is implementation specific, provided that the nonce meets the following requirements:

- The server MUST be able to verify that any nonce value received from the client in a request for a primary refresh token (section 3.2.5.1.2) matches a nonce that was previously issued by the server.
- The server SHOULD be able to verify that any nonce value received from the client in a request for a primary refresh token matches a nonce that was issued recently (see section 3.2.5.1.2.3).
- The server SHOULD use a method that makes it difficult for an attacker to guess valid nonce values.

3.2.5.1.2 POST (Request for Primary Refresh Token)

This method requests a primary refresh token that the client can then exchange for access tokens or user authentication certificates, as defined in sections 3.2.5.1.3 and 3.2.5.1.4.

This operation is transported by an HTTP **POST** and can be invoked through the following **URI**:

/token

3.2.5.1.2.1 Request Body

A signed request is passed as a **JSON Web Token (JWT)**, as specified in [OIDCCore] section 6.1, and the JWT is signed with a device key.

The format of the signed request is as follows:

```
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer&request=<signed JWT>
```

The signed JWT format is defined in [RFC7519].

The JWT fields MUST be given the following values:

client_id (REQUIRED): A unique identifier for the broker client.<a><4>

scope (REQUIRED): MUST contain at least the scopes "aza" and "openid". Additional scopes can be included and follow the format described in [RFC6749] section 3.3.

request_nonce (REQUIRED): A nonce previously obtained from the server by making the request described in section 3.1.5.1.1.

Additionally, the client MUST provide user authentication in the request. The client does this by including the JWT fields from one of the following:

- Section 3.2.5.1.2.1.1 for username and password authentication.
- Section 3.2.5.1.2.1.2 if using a signed JWT for authentication.

• Section 3.2.5.1.2.1.3 if using a previous refresh token for authentication.

The signature header fields MUST be given the following values:

typ (REQUIRED): "JWT"
alg (REQUIRED): "RS256"

x5c (REQUIRED): The certificate used to sign the request, following the format described in [RFC7515] section 4.1.6.

kdf_ver (OPTIONAL): If the capabilities field of the OpenID Provider Metadata ([MS-OIDCE] section 2.2.3.2) from the server includes the value "kdf_ver2", the client can use KDFv2 version for creating context, which is used in deriving the Session Key. This is used in flows to exchange a Primary Refresh token for another token or user authentication certificate, as defined in sections 3.1.5.1.3 and 3.1.5.1.4.

3.2.5.1.2.1.1 Username Password Authentication

If authenticating the user by using username and password, the client includes the following fields in the **JWT** described in section 3.2.5.1.2.1:

grant_type (REQUIRED): "password"

username (REQUIRED): The username of the user for which the primary refresh token is requested.

password (REQUIRED): The password of the user for which the primary refresh token is requested.

3.2.5.1.2.1.2 User JWT Authentication

If authenticating the user by using a signed **JWT**, the client includes the following fields in the JWT described in section 3.2.5.1.2.1:

grant_type (REQUIRED): "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer"

assertion (REQUIRED): A signed JWT used to authenticate the user.

The JWT fields for the JWT provided in the **assertion** field MUST be given the following values:

iss (REQUIRED): The username of the user for which the primary refresh token is requested.

iat (REQUIRED): See [OIDCCore] section 2.

exp (REQUIRED): See [OIDCCore] section 2.

aud (REQUIRED): The Issuer Identifier ([OIDCCore] section 1.2) of the server that the client is sending the request to.

request_nonce (REQUIRED): This is the same value as **request_nonce** as contained in the request body (section 3.2.5.1.2.1).

Note: The **request_nonce** value is supported in the **assertion** field by the operating systems specified in [MSFT-CVE-2023-35348], each with its related KB article download installed.

The signature header fields of the **assertion** field MUST be given the following values:

typ (REQUIRED): "JWT"

alg (REQUIRED): "RS256"

kid (REQUIRED): The identifier for the key used to sign the request.

use (REQUIRED): "ngc"

3.2.5.1.2.1.3 Refresh Token Authentication

If authenticating the user by using a previously obtained refresh token, the client includes the following fields in the **JWT** described in section 3.2.5.1.2.1:

grant type (REOUIRED): "refresh token"

refresh_token (REQUIRED): A refresh token ([RFC6749] section 1.5) that was previously obtained from the server.

3.2.5.1.2.1.4 User Certificate Authentication

If authenticating the user by using a signed **JWT**, the client includes the following fields in the JWT described in section 3.2.5.1.2.1:

grant_type (REQUIRED): "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer"

assertion (REQUIRED): A signed JWT used to authenticate the user based upon a certificate that identifies the user.

The JWT fields for the JWT that is provided in the **assertion** field MUST be given the following values:

iss (REQUIRED): The username of the user for which the primary refresh token is requested.

iat (REQUIRED): See [OIDCCore] section 2.

exp (REQUIRED): See [OIDCCore] section 2.

aud (REQUIRED): The Issuer Identifier ([OIDCCore] section 1.2) of the server that the client is sending the request to.

The signature header fields of the **assertion** field MUST be given the following values:

typ (REQUIRED): "JWT"

alg (REQUIRED): "RS256"

x5c (REQUIRED): The certificate used to sign the request, following the format described in [RFC7515] section 4.1.6.

3.2.5.1.2.2 Response Body

The response to the request is a **JSON** object with the following fields:

token_type (REQUIRED): The string "pop", indicating that the returned refresh token requires proof of possession.

refresh_token (REQUIRED): A primary refresh token. Like a refresh token described in [RFC6749] section 1.5, this can be used by clients to obtain fresh access tokens. Unlike the refresh tokens described in [RFC6749], the primary refresh token requires additional proof of possession to use as described in section 3.2.5.1.3, and can be used by any client known to the server.

refresh_token_expires_in (REQUIRED): The validity interval for the primary refresh token in seconds, as an integer.

session_key_jwe (REQUIRED): A base64 URL-encoded and encrypted key value. The key is encrypted using the JSON Web Encryption (JWE) standard [RFC7516]. The relevant part of the

JWE is the encrypted key section, which the client will use for future signature and decryption operations as described in section 3.1.5.1.3.

id_token (REQUIRED): An ID token for the user that is authenticated in the request, as described in [OIDCCore]. The audience for the ID token, that is, the aud field, is the same value given in section 3.2.5.1.2.1 for the client_id field. The token does not need to be signed.

3.2.5.1.2.3 Processing Details

After receiving the request, the server verifies the signature of the request and also verifies that the **request_nonce** is a nonce value previously issued by the server as defined in section 3.2.5.1.1. The server SHOULD also verify that the nonce was issued recently. $\leq 5 >$ If the signature or nonce are invalid, the server returns the error "invalid_grant" using the format described in [RFC6749] section 5.2.

The server then processes the request as a resource owner password credentials grant (see [RFC6749] section 4.3) using the **client_id** field of the request with the following modifications:

- The server authenticates the user based on the fields of the request:
 - If the request uses username and password authentication as in section 3.2.5.1.2.1.1, the server authenticates the user as in a resource owner password credentials grant ([RFC6749] section 4.3) using the **client_id**, **scope**, and **password** fields of the request.
 - If the request uses user JWT authentication as in section 3.2.5.1.2.1.2, the server processes the request as follows:
 - 1. The server finds the user object in Active Directory with a user principal name ([MS-ADTS] section 5.1.1.1.1) matching the **iss** field of the **assertion** JWT.
 - 2. It finds the public key for the signature by finding the value of the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute on the user object for which the SHA-256 hash ([FIPS180-2] section 6.2.2) of the attribute value matches the **kid** field of the **assertion** JWT.

If the **kid** of the authenticated device does not match the **kid** of the **assertion** JWT, the server SHOULD verify that the **assertion** contains the **request_nonce** field and that it also matches the **request_nonce** present in the request body (section 3.2.5.1.2.1). Otherwise, the server MUST return the "invalid_grant" error using the format described in section 5 of [RFC6749].

Note: This behavior is supported by the operating systems specified in [MSFT-CVE-2023-35348], each with its related KB article download installed.

- 3. The server then verifies the signature of the **assertion** JWT by using the public key that was found in the previous step.
- 4. If any of the corresponding objects or values cannot be found or the signature of the **assertion** JWT is not valid, the server returns the "invalid_grant" error using the format described in [RFC6749] section 5.2.
- If the request uses refresh token authentication as in section <u>3.2.5.1.2.1.3</u>, the server validates the refresh token as in [RFC6749] section 6.
- If the request uses user certificate authentication as in section 3.2.5.1.2.1.4, the server verifies the signature of the assertion JWT and authenticates the user for whom the certificate in the x5c header field was issued.
- The server uses the response format described in section 3.2.5.1.2.2 for successful responses; error responses are returned as described in [RFC6749] section 5.2.

- If the server requires user interaction at the authorization endpoint ([MS-OAPX] section 3.2.5.1) before processing this request (for example, to give consent or to provide additional authentication), the server returns the interaction_required error using the format described in [RFC6749] section 5.2.
- The server does NOT issue an access token.
- The server MUST issue a primary refresh token (in place of a normal refresh token) and include it in the **refresh_token** field of the response.

Note: Primary refresh tokens are opaque to the client. The structure and content of a primary refresh token is implementation-specific. However, it must include information that allows the server to find the associated user in the identity data store that is being used (for example, **Active Directory**).

• The server MUST include an ID token [OIDCCore] in the id_token field response.

The server finds the msDS-Device object in Active Directory that has an altSecurityIdentities value matching the value of the *x5c* parameter of the request header. The server then populates the **session_key_jwe** field of the response by creating a session key and encrypting it by following the process in [RFC7516] section 5.1 and by using the session transport key found in the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of the previously located msDS-Device object.

3.2.5.1.3 POST (Exchange Primary Refresh Token for Access Token)

Given the primary refresh token that was obtained in section <u>3.2.5.1.2</u>, this method requests an access token.

This operation is transported by an HTTP **POST** and can be invoked through the following **URI**:

/token

3.2.5.1.3.1 Request Body

A signed request is passed as a **JSON Web Token (JWT)**, as specified in [OIDCCore] section 6.1, and the JWT is signed with a session key.

The format of the signed request is as follows:

```
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer&request=<signed JWT>
```

The signed JWT format is defined in [RFC7519].

The JWT fields MUST be given the following values:

client_id (REQUIRED): The client identifier for the client ([RFC6749] section 1.1) to which an access token is to be issued. If the request is made through a broker client, then this is the client identifier of the client that the broker is acting on behalf of.

scope (REQUIRED): The scope that the client requests for the access token, as defined in [RFC6749] section 3.3. The client MUST include the scope "openid" in the request. If the scope "aza" is included in the request, the server includes a new primary refresh token in the response.

resource (OPTIONAL): The resource for which the access token is requested, as defined in [MS-OAPX] section 2.2.3.

```
iat (REQUIRED): See [OIDCCore] section 2.
```

exp (REQUIRED): See [OIDCCore] section 2.

grant_type (REQUIRED): "refresh_token"

refresh_token (REQUIRED): A primary refresh token that was previously received from the server. See section 3.1.5.1.2.

The JWT header fields MUST be given the following values:

- **alg** (REQUIRED): The supported value is "HS256", which indicates the algorithm used for the signature. See [RFC7515] section 4.
- **ctx** (REQUIRED): The base64-encoded bytes used for signature key derivation. Refer to section 3.1.5.1.3.3 for details.
- kdf_ver (OPTIONAL): If ctx was created using KDFv2, the client MUST include the JWT header with the kdf_ver field set to 2.

3.2.5.1.3.2 Response Body

The response format is an encrypted JWT. The encrypted JWT (or JWE) format is described in [RFC7516].

The JWT header fields MUST be given the following values:

alg (REQUIRED): "dir"

enc (REQUIRED): "A256GCM"

ctx (REQUIRED): The base64-encoded binary value used for encryption key derivation.

kid (REQUIRED): "session"

After decryption, the JWT response MUST contain the following elements:

access_token (REQUIRED): An access token for the client. See the *access_token* parameter in [RFC6749] section 5.1.

token type (REQUIRED): "bearer"

expires_in (REQUIRED): The lifetime, in seconds, of the access token. See the *expires_in* parameter in [RFC6749] section 5.1.

refresh_token (OPTIONAL): The new primary refresh token.

refresh_token_expires_in (OPTIONAL): The lifetime, in seconds, of the primary refresh token returned in the **refresh_token** field of the response.

scope (REQUIRED): The scopes included in the access token.

id_token (OPTIONAL): An ID token for the user that was authenticated in the request, as defined in [OIDCCore]. The audience for the ID token, that is, the aud field, is the same value given in section 3.2.5.1.3.1 for the client id field. The token does not need to be signed.

3.2.5.1.3.3 Processing Details

The server verifies that the request was signed by the client with a key derived from the session key previously issued to the client using the process for deriving the signing key described in section

<u>3.1.5.1.3.3</u>. If the signature is invalid, the server returns the error "invalid_grant" using the format described in [RFC6749] section 5.2.

If the *resource* query parameter is invalid or is not found to be registered on the **AD FS server**, the AD FS server responds to the OAuth 2.0 client according to the requirements of [RFC6749] section 4.1.2.1 (Error Response). The REQUIRED error parameter of the response MUST be set to the invalid_resource error code, which is defined in [MS-OAPX] section 2.2.4.1.

The server then issues an access token for the requested resource following the process in [RFC6749] section 6, using the **scope** and **refresh_token** values provided in the request, with the following exceptions:

- The response format is as described in section <u>3.2.5.1.3.2</u> for successful responses; error responses are returned as described in [RFC6749] section 5.2.
- If the server requires user interaction at the authorization endpoint ([MS-OAPX] section 3.2.5.1) before processing this request (for example, to give consent or to provide additional authentication), the server returns the interaction_required error using the format described in [RFC6749] section 5.2.
- If the scope parameter contains the scope "aza", the server issues a new primary refresh token
 and sets it in the refresh_token field of the response, as well as setting the
 refresh_token_expires_in field to the lifetime of the new primary refresh token if one is
 enforced.
- The scope of the issued access token is always returned in the scope response field, even if it is
 the same as the scope in the request.
- The server can include an ID token (see [OIDCCore]) in the id_token field of the response.

The server encrypts the response using a key that was derived by using the same process as that used for deriving the signing key, as defined in section 3.1.5.1.3.3.

3.2.5.1.4 POST (Exchange Primary Refresh Token for User Authentication Certificate)

Given the primary refresh token that was obtained in section 3.2.5.1.2, this method requests a certificate that can be used to authenticate the user. $\leq 6 \geq$

This operation is transported by an HTTP **POST** and can be invoked through the following **URI**:

/token

3.2.5.1.4.1 Request Body

A signed request is passed as a **JSON Web Token (JWT)**, as specified in [OIDCCore] section 6.1, and the JWT is signed with a session key.

The format of the signed request is as follows:

```
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer&request=<signed JWT>
```

The signed JWT format is defined in [RFC7519].

The JWT fields MUST be given the following values:

- **client_id** (REQUIRED): The client identifier for the client ([RFC6749] section 1.1) to which an access token is to be issued. If the request is made through a broker client, then this is the client identifier of the client that the broker is acting on behalf of.
- **scope** (REQUIRED): The scope that the client requests for the access token, as defined in [RFC6749] section 3.3. The client MUST include the scope "winhello_cert" in the request. If the scope "aza" is included in the request, the server includes a new primary refresh token in the response.

resource (REQUIRED): "urn:microsoft:winhello:cert:prov:server"

cert_token_use (REQUIRED): "winhello_cert"

csr_type (REQUIRED): "http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/pki/2009/01/enrollment#PKCS10"

csr (REQUIRED): A **base64-encoded** PKCS #10 certificate request, which has been constructed as defined in section 3.1.5.1.4.3.

pctx (OPTIONAL): A value with data-store information, which has been constructed as defined in section 3.1.5.1.4.3.

krctx (OPTIONAL): A value with JWT information, which has been constructed as defined in section 2.2.2.1.

iat (REQUIRED): See [OIDCCore] section 2.

exp (REQUIRED): See [OIDCCore] section 2.

grant_type (REQUIRED): "refresh_token"

refresh_token (REQUIRED): A primary refresh token that was previously received from the server. See section 3.1.5.1.2.

The JWT header fields MUST be given the following values:

- **alg** (REQUIRED): The supported value is "HS256", which indicates the algorithm used for the signature. See [RFC7515] section 4.
- **ctx** (REQUIRED): The base64-encoded bytes used for signature key derivation. Refer to section 3.1.5.1.3.3 for details.
- kdf_ver (OPTIONAL): If ctx was created using KDFv2, the client MUST include the JWT header with the kdf_ver field set to 2.

3.2.5.1.4.2 Response Body

The response format is an encrypted **JWT**. The encrypted JWT (or JSON Web Encryption (JWE)) format is described in [RFC7516].

The JWT header fields MUST be given the following values:

alg (REQUIRED): "dir"

enc (REQUIRED): "A256GCM"

ctx (REQUIRED): The base64-encoded binary value used for encryption-key derivation.

kid (REQUIRED): "session"

After decryption, the JWT response MUST contain the following elements:

x5c (REQUIRED): A base64-encoded Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) certificate chain or a Certificate Management Messages over CMS (CMC) full PKI response (see [MS-WCCE] section 2.2.2.8) containing a certificate that can be used to authenticate the user.

token_type (REQUIRED): "bearer"

expires_in (REQUIRED): An integer value. See the *expires_in* parameter in [RFC6749] section 5.1. Clients MUST ignore this value.

refresh_token (OPTIONAL): The new primary refresh token.

refresh_token_expires_in (OPTIONAL): The lifetime, in seconds, of the primary refresh token returned in the **refresh_token** field of the response.

scope (REQUIRED): The scopes that were granted for this request.

id_token (REQUIRED): An ID token for the user that was authenticated in the request, as defined in [OIDCCore]. The audience for the ID token, that is, the aud field, is the same value given in section 3.2.5.1.4.1 for the client_id field. The token does not need to be signed.

3.2.5.1.4.3 Processing Details

The server verifies that the request was signed by the client with a key derived from the session key previously issued to the client using the process for deriving the signing key described in section 3.1.5.1.4.3. If the signature is invalid, the server returns the error "invalid_grant" using the format described in [RFC6749] section 5.2.

If the request includes the *krctx* parameter, the server uses the following rules to verify the **JWT** contained in the parameter, and then uses the claims in the JWT to authorize the request:

- The JWT MUST contain the ngc_key claim whose value matches the PKCS #10 **public key** value from the **csr** field.
- The JWT MUST contain the onprem_sid claim whose value matches the sid claim value from the primary refresh token that the client previously received from the AD FS server (section 3.2.5.1.2).
- The JWT MUST be signed with a certificate that is trusted by the server.

If the *resource* parameter is invalid, the AD FS server responds to the OAuth 2.0 client according to the requirements of [RFC6749] section 4.1.2.1 (Error Response). The REQUIRED error parameter of the response MUST be set to the invalid_resource error code, which is defined in [MS-OAPX] section 2.2.4.1.

- If the csr_type field of the request is not present or is not set to a value of "http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/pki/2009/01/enrollment#PKCS10", the AD FS server MUST send an error response to the OAuth 2.0 client according to the requirements of [RFC6749] section 5.2 (Error Response). The REQUIRED error parameter of the response MUST be set to invalid_request.
- If the **csr** field of the request is not present or is not a valid **base64-encoded** PKCS #10 request ([MS-WCCE] section 2.2.2.6.1), the AD FS server MUST send an error response to the OAuth 2.0 client according to the requirements of [RFC6749] section 5.2 (Error Response). The REQUIRED error parameter of the response MUST be set to invalid_request.
- The server validates that the PKCS #10 request in the **csr** field was built using a public key that is registered to the user represented in the **refresh_token** field of the request:
 - The server finds the corresponding user object in Active Directory for the user represented in the refresh_token field of the request. If the client provided a value in the pctx field of

the request and that value is well-formed and has a valid signature, the server uses the hint provided when choosing a **domain controller (DC)** to search. The format of the **pctx** value is described in [MS-KPP] section 3.1.5.1.1.2.

It checks the values of the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute on the user object for any that match the public key provided in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo ([MS-WCCE] section 2.2.2.6.1) portion of the PKCS #10 request provided in the **csr** request field. If no match is found, the server returns the "invalid_request" error using the format described in [RFC6749] section 5.2.

The server then issues an access token for the requested resource following the process in [RFC6749] section 6, using the **scope** and **refresh_token** values provided in the request, with the following exceptions:

- The response format is as defined in section <u>3.2.5.1.4.2</u> for successful responses; error responses are returned as described in [RFC6749] section 5.2.
- The AD FS server provides a base64-encoded **CMS** certificate chain or a **CMC** full PKI response ([MS-WCCE] section 2.2.2.8) in the **x5c** response field. The response that is given in the **x5c** field is created based upon the request in the **csr** request field, as described in [MS-WCCE] section 3.2.1.4.2.1.4.1, with the following exceptions:
 - All fields in the original request except for SubjectPublicKeyInfo ([MS-WCCE] section 2.2.2.6.1) are ignored.
 - The Subject field of the x5c response field MUST match the identity that is represented by the refresh token provided in the refresh_token request field.
- If the server requires user interaction at the authorization endpoint ([MS-OAPX] section 3.2.5.1) before processing this request (for example, to give consent or to provide additional authentication), the server returns the interaction_required error using the format described in [RFC6749] section 5.2.
- If the scope parameter contains the scope "aza", the server issues a new primary refresh token
 and sets it in the refresh_token field of the response, as well as setting the
 refresh_token_expires_in field to the lifetime of the new primary refresh token if one is
 enforced.
- The scope of the issued access token is always returned in the **scope** response field, even if it is the same as the scope in the request.
- The server can include an ID token [OIDCCore] in the **id_token** field of the response, regardless of whether the client requests the openid scope.

The server encrypts the response using a key that was derived by using the same process as that used for deriving the signing key, as defined in section 3.1.5.1.4.3.

3.2.5.2 Authorization endpoint (/authorize)

As defined in [RFC6749] section 3.1 (Authorization Endpoint), the authorization endpoint on the authorization server is used to interact with the resource owner and obtain an authorization grant. The following HTTP method is allowed to be performed on this endpoint.

HTTP method	Description
<u>GET</u>	An authorization request issued by the OAuth 2.0 client to the authorization endpoint of the AD FS server in accordance with the requirements of [RFC6749] section 4.1.1 (Authorization Request).

3.2.5.2.1 GET

This method is transported by an HTTP GET.

The request, response, and processing details of this method are the same as those specified in [MS-OAPX] section 3.2.5.1.1, with the following additions.

3.2.5.2.1.1 Request Body

The request body of this method is the same as that specified in [MS-OAPX] section 3.2.5.1.1.1, with the following addition.

When this method is used in the OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions for Broker Clients, the request message for this method can also contain the following optional HTTP headers. The header syntax is defined in section 2.2.1.

Request header	Usage	Value
x-ms- RefreshTokenCredential	This optional header can be used by the client to specify a primary refresh token when contacting the authorization endpoint.	A JWT containing a primary refresh token that the client has previously obtained from the AD FS server , formatted as described in section 2.2.1.1.
x-ms-DeviceCredential	This optional header can be used by the client to authenticate the device on which the client is running when contacting the authorization endpoint.	A JWT signed with a device certificate, formatted as described in section 2.2.1.2.

3.2.5.2.1.1.1 x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential HTTP header format

The **x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential** HTTP header is a signed **JWT**, as defined in section 2.2.1.1.

The JWT fields MUST be given the following values:

iat (OPTIONAL): See [OIDCCore] section 2.

refresh_token (REQUIRED): A primary refresh token that was previously received from the server. See section 3.1.5.1.2.

request_nonce (REQUIRED): A nonce previously obtained from the server by making the request. See section 3.1.5.1.1.

ua client id (OPTIONAL): A client id of the user-agent using this header.

ua_redirect_uri (OPTIONAL): A redirect_uri of the user-agent using this header

x_client_platform (OPTIONAL): The value is used to inform the AAD/server the platform on which
this header is created.

win_ver (OPTIONAL): This claim has the operating system version information.<a><<a><a>

windows_api_version (OPTIONAL): The version value is "2.0.1". This information is used to indicate to the server that the client has the ability to handle nonce challenges.

The JWT header fields MUST be given the following values:

alg (REQUIRED): The supported value is "HS256", which indicates the algorithm that is used for the signature. See [RFC7515] section 4.

ctx (REQUIRED): The base64-encoded bytes used for signature key derivation. Refer to section 3.1.5.2.1.3 for details.

kdf_ver (OPTIONAL): If ctx was created using KDFv2, the client MUST include the JWT header with this field value set to 2.

3.2.5.2.1.1.2 x-ms-DeviceCredential HTTP header format

The x-ms-DeviceCredential HTTP header is a signed JWT, as defined in section 2.2.1.2,.

The JWT fields MUST be given the following values: <9>

grant_type (OPTIONAL): Set to "device_auth" if present.

iss (OPTIONAL): Set to "aad:brokerplugin" if present.

request_nonce (REQUIRED): A nonce previously obtained from the server by making the request. See section 3.1.5.1.1.

ua client id (OPTIONAL): A client id of the user-agent using this header.

ua_redirect_uri (OPTIONAL): A redirect uri of the user-agent using this header.

x_client_platform (OPTIONAL): The value is used to inform AAD/server the platform on which this header is created.<10>

win_ver (OPTIONAL): This claim has the operating system version information. <11>

windows_api_version (OPTIONAL): The version value is "2.0.1". This information is used to indicate to the server that the client has the ability to handle nonce challenges.

The signature header fields MUST be given the following values:

typ (REQUIRED): "JWT"

alg (REQUIRED): "RS256"

x5c (REQUIRED): The certificate is used to sign the request, following the format specified in [RFC7515] section 4.1.6.

3.2.5.2.1.2 Response Body

The response body of this method is the same as that specified in [MS-OAPX] section 3.2.5.1.1.2.

3.2.5.2.1.3 Processing Details

The processing details are the same as those specified in [MS-OAPX] section 3.2.5.1.1.3, with the following additions.

The **AD FS server** processes the x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential HTTP header as follows.

- 1. The AD FS server checks the security policy of the resource owner to verify that user credentials received from a previously issued token can be used to authenticate and authorize users.
- The server verifies the signature of the header and also verifies that the request_nonce is a nonce value previously issued by the server as defined in section 3.2.5.1.1. The server SHOULD<12> also verify that the nonce was issued recently. If the signature or

request_nonce are invalid, the server ignores the x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential HTTP header; if the <u>x-ms-DeviceCredential HTTP header</u> is present, the client processes it as follows, otherwise it continues processing the request as in [MS-OAPX] section 3.2.5.1.1.3.

3. The AD FS server extracts the primary refresh token from the **refresh_token** field of the x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential HTTP header. If the refresh token provided is a valid primary refresh token that was previously issued by the server, then the AD FS server authenticates the user and device to which the primary refresh token was issued and continues processing the request as in [MS-OAPX] section 3.2.5.1.1.3.

If the AD FS server did not receive a valid x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential HTTP header, then it processes a received x-ms-DeviceCredential HTTP header as follows:

The server verifies the signature of the header and also verifies that the request_nonce is a nonce value previously issued by the server as defined in section 3.2.5.1.1. The server SHOULD<13> also verify that the nonce was issued recently. If the signature or request_nonce are invalid, the server ignores the x-ms-DeviceCredential HTTP header and continues processing the request. If the signature is valid, then the AD FS server authenticates the device and continues processing the request as in [MS-OAPX] section 3.2.5.1.1.3.

If the client provided a referred token-binding ID using the *tbidv2* POST body parameter ([MS-OAPX] section 2.2.3), the AD FS Server secures the response Access Token with the referred token-binding ID that was provided.

3.2.6 Timer Events

None.

3.2.7 Other Local Events

None.

4 Protocol Examples

The following sections show examples of the requests and responses that are defined by the OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions for Broker Clients.

Note: Throughout these examples, the fictitious name "server.example.com" is used as it is used in [RFC6749].

Note: Throughout these examples, the HTTP samples line breaks were added and irrelevant fields were removed to enhance readability.

4.1 Obtain a Nonce

The following example shows a request from the broker client to the AD FS server for a nonce (section 3.2.5.1.1.1) and the response from the AD FS server that contains the nonce (section 3.2.5.1.1.2).

Request:

```
POST https://server.example.com/adfs/oauth2/token/
HTTP/1.1 {
    Content-Type=application/x-www-form-urlencoded,
    Host=server.example.com,
    Content-Length=24,
    Expect=[100-continue]
  }
  grant type=srv challenge
```

Response:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
{
   Content-Length=1200,
   Content-Type=application/json; charset=UTF-8
}
{"Nonce":"eyJWZXJza..."}
```

4.2 Obtain a Primary Refresh Token

The following example shows a request from the broker client to the AD FS server for a primary refresh token (section 3.2.5.1.2.1) using the obtained nonce (section 4.1) and the response from the AD FS server that contains the primary refresh token (section 3.2.5.1.2.2).

Request:

```
POST https://server.example.com/adfs/oauth2/token/
HTTP/1.1
{
    Content-Type=application/x-www-form-urlencoded,
    Host=server.example.com,
    Content-Length=4176,
    Expect=[100-continue]
}
MessageOffset:251
grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Ajwt-bearer
&request=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1...
```

As described in sections 3.2.5.1.2.1 and $\underline{3.2.5.1.2.1.1}$, the content of the request parameter above is a signed JWT. An example of the raw JWT with header is given below.

```
"typ":"JWT",
"alg":"RS256",
"x5c":["MIIEMzC..."]
}

"client_id":"38aa3b87-a06d-4817-b275-7a316988d93b",
"scope":"aza openid",
"grant type":"password",
"username":"janedoe@example.com",
"password":"password",
"request_nonce":"eyJWZXJza..."
```

Response:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
{
   Content-Length=6123,
   Content-Type=application/json; charset=UTF-8
}
{
   "token type":"pop",
   "refresh_token":"rghyF1xMq2YQTbE..."
   "refresh_token_expires_in":604800,
   "session_key_jwe":"eyJlbmMiOiJBMjU2R0NNIi...",
   "id_token":"eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGci..."
}
```

4.3 Obtain an Access Token

The following example shows a request from the broker client to the AD FS server for an access token (section 3.2.5.1.3.1) using the obtained primary refresh token (section 4.2) and the response from the AD FS server that contains the access token (section 3.2.5.1.3.2).

Request:

```
POST https://server.example.com/adfs/oauth2/token/
HTTP/1.1
{
    Content-Type=application/x-www-form-urlencoded,
    Host=server.example.com,
    Content-Length=4630,
    Expect=[100-continue]
}
grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Ajwt-bearer
&request=eyJhbGciOiJIUz...
```

As described in section 3.2.5.1.3.1, the content of the request parameter above is a signed JWT. An example of the raw JWT with header is given below.

```
{
  "alg":"HS256",
  "ctx":"alusEDoF8fY+3p3EPnLFzBj12DUty00v",
}
{
  "client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3",
```

```
"scope":"aza openid",
"resource":"https://resource_server1",
"iat":1443739462,
"exp":1443743062,
"grant_type":"refresh_token",
"refresh token":"rghyF1xMq2YQTbE..."
```

Response:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
{
   Content-Length=8739,
   Content-Type=application/json; charset=UTF-8
}
eyJhbGciOiJka...
```

As described in section 3.2.5.1.3.2, the content of the response above is an encrypted JWT. An example of the decrypted JWT with header is given below.

```
{
  "alg":"dir",
  "enc":"A256GCM",
  "ctx":"alusEDoF8fY+3p3EPnLFzBjl2DUty00v",
  "kid":"session"
}
{
  "access_token":"eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiL...",
  "token_type":"bearer",
  "expires_in":3600,
  "refresh_token":"xWsRetnGYw6T...",
  "refresh_token_expires_in":604800,
  "scope":"profile",
  "id_token":"eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1..."
}
```

4.4 Obtain a User Authentication Certificate

The following example shows a request from the broker client to the **AD FS server** for a user authentication certificate (section 3.2.5.1.4.1) using the obtained primary refresh token (section 4.2) and the response from the AD FS server that contains the user authentication certificate (section 3.2.5.1.4.2).

Request:

```
POST https://server.example.com/adfs/oauth2/token/
HTTP/1.1
{
    Content-Type=application/x-www-form-urlencoded,
    Host=server.example.com,
    Content-Length=4630,
    Expect=[100-continue]
}
grant type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Ajwt-bearer
&request=eyJhbGciOiJIUz...
```

As described in section 3.2.5.1.4.1, the content of the request parameter is a signed **JWT**. The following is an example of the raw JWT with header.

```
{
  "alg":"HS256",
  "ctx":"alusEDoF8fY+3p3EPnLFzBj12DUty0Ov",
}
{
  "client id":"s6BhdRkqt3",
  "scope":"aza openid winhello_cert",
  "resource":"urn:microsoft:winhello:cert:prov:server",
  "csr_type":"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/pki/2009/01/enrollment#PKCS10",
  "cert_token_use":"winhello_cert"
  "csr":"MIIEpjCCA44...",
  "iat":1443739462,
  "exp":1443743062,
  "grant_type":"refresh_token",
  "refresh_token":"rghyF1xMq2YQTbE..."
}
```

Response:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
{
   Content-Length=8739,
   Content-Type=application/json; charset=UTF-8
}
eyJhbGciOiJka...
```

As described in section 3.2.5.1.4.2, the content of the response is an encrypted JWT. The following is an example of the decrypted JWT with header.

```
{
  "alg":"dir",
  "enc":"A256GCM",
  "ctx":"alusEDoF8fY+3p3EPnLFzBj12DUty00v",
  "kid":"session"
}
{
  "x5c":"MIISwgYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIS... ",
  "token_type":"bearer",
  "expires in":3600,
  "refresh_token":"xWsRetnGYw6T...",
  "refresh_token_expires_in":604800,
  "scope":"profile",
  "id_token":"eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1..."
}
```

5 Security

5.1 Security Considerations for Implementers

None.

5.2 Index of Security Parameters

None.

6 Appendix A: Product Behavior

The information in this specification is applicable to the following Microsoft products or supplemental software. References to product versions include updates to those products.

The terms "earlier" and "later", when used with a product version, refer to either all preceding versions or all subsequent versions, respectively. The term "through" refers to the inclusive range of versions. Applicable Microsoft products are listed chronologically in this section.

The following tables show the relationships between Microsoft product versions or supplemental software and the roles they perform.

Windows Client release	OAuthBrokerExtension Client role	OAuthBrokerExtension Server role
Windows 10 v1511 operating system	Yes	No
Windows 11 operating system	Yes	No

Windows Server release	OAuthBrokerExtension Client role	OAuthBrokerExtension Server role
Windows Server 2016 operating system	Yes	Yes
Windows Server operating system	No	Yes
Windows Server 2019 operating system	Yes	Yes
Windows Server 2022 operating system	No	Yes

Exceptions, if any, are noted in this section. If an update version, service pack or Knowledge Base (KB) number appears with a product name, the behavior changed in that update. The new behavior also applies to subsequent updates unless otherwise specified. If a product edition appears with the product version, behavior is different in that product edition.

Unless otherwise specified, any statement of optional behavior in this specification that is prescribed using the terms "SHOULD" or "SHOULD NOT" implies product behavior in accordance with the SHOULD or SHOULD NOT prescription. Unless otherwise specified, the term "MAY" implies that the product does not follow the prescription.

<1> Section 2.2.2.1: Even though AD_FS_BEHAVIOR_LEVEL_3 is supported on Windows Server 2016, the krctx parameter and the "winhello_cert_kr" value are supported on Windows Server 2016 only if [MSKB-4088889] is installed.

<2> Section 3.1.5.1.3.3: This protocol now supports KDF Version 2 for creating derived keys, which is used by clients to create a signed **JWT**. KDF Version 2 is supported on the operating systems specified in [MSFT-CVE-2021-33781], each with its related KB article download installed.

<a>Section 3.1.5.1.4: The POST (Exchange Primary Refresh Token for User Authentication Certificate) method is not supported in Windows 10 v1511 or Windows 10 v1607 operating system.

This method is exercised in Windows 10 v1703 operating system and later only if [MSKB-4022723] is installed on Windows Server 2016 or if a later version of the product is being used for the server role.

- <4> Section 3.2.5.1.2.1: Windows clients use the identifier "38aa3b87-a06d-4817-b275-7a316988d93b" to represent the broker client.
- <5> Section 3.2.5.1.2.3: The Windows implementation of the AD FS server verifies that the nonce was issued within the last 10 minutes.
- <7> Section 3.2.5.2.1.1.1: The default value is "windows" for the Windows platform.
- <8> Section 3.2.5.2.1.1.1: The win_ver value is the Windows version information.
- <9> Section 3.2.5.2.1.1.2: The Windows implementation of the client role supplies the values specified for grant_type and iss, but the Windows implementation of the server role ignores them.
- <10> Section 3.2.5.2.1.1.2: The default value is "windows" for the Windows platform.
- <11> Section 3.2.5.2.1.1.2: The win_ver value is the Windows version information.
- \leq 12> Section 3.2.5.2.1.3: The Windows implementation of the AD FS server verifies that the nonce was issued within the last 10 minutes.
- <13> Section 3.2.5.2.1.3: The Windows implementation of the AD FS server verifies that the nonce was issued within the last 10 minutes.

7 Change Tracking

This section identifies changes that were made to this document since the last release. Changes are classified as Major, Minor, or None.

The revision class **Major** means that the technical content in the document was significantly revised. Major changes affect protocol interoperability or implementation. Examples of major changes are:

- A document revision that incorporates changes to interoperability requirements.
- A document revision that captures changes to protocol functionality.

The revision class **Minor** means that the meaning of the technical content was clarified. Minor changes do not affect protocol interoperability or implementation. Examples of minor changes are updates to clarify ambiguity at the sentence, paragraph, or table level.

The revision class **None** means that no new technical changes were introduced. Minor editorial and formatting changes may have been made, but the relevant technical content is identical to the last released version.

The changes made to this document are listed in the following table. For more information, please contact dochelp@microsoft.com.

Section	Description	Revision class
3.2.5.1.2.1 Request Body	11665 : Clarified that the JSON Web Token is signed with a device key.	Major
3.2.5.1.3.1 Request Body	11665 : Clarified that the JSON Web Token is signed with a session key.	Major
3.2.5.1.3.1 Request Body	11684 : Added a reference to section 3.1.5.1.3.3 to provide information about the ctx parameter.	Major
3.2.5.1.4.1 Request Body	11665 : Clarified that the JSON Web Token is signed with a session key.	Major

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